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Abstract
This Article aims at understanding the potential of partnerships of the European Union (‘EU‘)
with emergent global actors (the so-called new leading powers (‘NLPs‘) or ‘BRIC countries‘),
focusing on international trade law and policy. Although the power base of these actors (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China–the BRIC countries) is their respective region (South America for the
case of Brazil, Eastern Europe for Russia, the Subcontinent for India, and the Far East for China),
there may be specific policy areas in which their influence might be global. With this in mind,
the Article raises interesting questions: Is the EU an attractive trade partner for the new leading
powers? Does the EU want cooperation with the BRIC countries? What can the EU expect from
cooperation with the BRIC countries? What are the characteristics of these partners? What are the
EU’s priorities in its foreign trade policy? With which partners should the EU cooperate in which
policy areas? With which instruments can the EU engage these partners and how can internal
coordination within the EU be ensured?
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INTRODUCTION
This Article aims at understanding the potential of partner-
ships of the European Union ("EU") with emergent global ac-
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1. BRIC is a term used in economics to refer to the combination of Brazil, Russia,
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though the power base of these actors (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China-the BRIC countries) is their respective region (South
America for the case of Brazil, Eastern Europe for Russia, the
Subcontinent for India, and the Far East for China), 2 there may
be specific policy areas in which their influence might be
global? With this in mind, the Article raises interesting ques-
tions: Is the EU an attractive trade partner for the new leading
powers? Does the EU want cooperation with the BRIC coun-
tries? What can the EU expect from cooperation with the BRIC
countries? What are the characteristics of these partners? What
are the EU's priorities in its foreign trade policy? With which
partners should the EU cooperate in which policy areas? With
which instruments can the EU engage these partners and how
can internal coordination within the EU be ensured?
This Article argues that the EU's objective of engaging with
the BRIC countries on trade matters is to establish peace, secur-
ity, and prosperity in the twenty-first century. Trade creates eco-
nomic ties and generates more prosperity; thus it contributes to
peace and security, since nations that trade with each other do
not go to war. An example is the EU integration project. The
same argument is true multilaterally: before the creation of
Doha Round in 2001, developing and least-developed countries
India, and China. General thinking is that the term was first prominently used in a
thesis by Jim O'Neill, chief global economist, at the Goldman Sachs investment bank.
O'Neill argues that the economic potential of Brazil, Russia, India, and China is such
that they may become among the four most dominant economies by the year 2050.
These countries encompass over twenty-five percent of the world's land coverage and
forty percent of the world's population. The BRIC countries have taken steps to in-
crease their political cooperation, mainly as a way of influencing the position of the
United States on major trade accords, or, through the implicit threat of political coop-
eration, as a way of extracting political concessions from the United States, such as the
proposed nuclear cooperation with India. See generally Goldman Sachs, BRICs, http://
www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008);
Wikipedia, BRIC, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRIC#citenote-0 (last visited Oct. 24,
2008) (summarizing O'Neill's BRIC thesis).
2. For an economic analysis of the success of the BRIC countries, see generally
Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050
(Goldman Sachs, Global Econ. Paper No. 99, 2003) (providing economic analysis of the
potential for success of the BRIC countries).
3. In 2007, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") ranked China as the fourth
wealthiest nation in the world in absolute terms; Brazil, Russia, and India came in tenth,
eleventh, and twelfth respectively. See International Monetary Fund, Report for Selected
Countries and Subjects, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008, http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
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had been marginalized in the world trading system,4 which
brought with it serious economic implications. In 2001 in Doha
(Qatar), developing countries were promised inclusion in the
world trading system in order to achieve a higher level ofjustice
and equity in the world. That is why the Doha Round is called
the development agenda.' The argument is that a more open
and equitable trading system 6 brings peace to the world and, in
this sense, the Doha Round should not be approached as a zero-
sum game-as many developing countries seem to perceive it-
but as a win-win situation.7 To achieve this, a new and better
4. See generally Faizel Ismail, How Can Least-Developed Countries and Other Small, Weak
and Vulnerable Economies Also Gain from the Doha Development Agenda on the Road to Hong
Kong?, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (2006) (focusing on the concerns and perspectives of
least-developed countries ("LDCs")).
5. Not everyone agrees with the governmental position that the Doha Round is
beneficial to developing and least-developed countries. For severe criticisms of the
Doha Round, see Commission Memo, MEMO/06/247 (June 23, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/247&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (noting gains limitations for the
"poorest and most vulnerable countries .. "); Press Release, Oxfam, New WTO Frame-
work Doesn't Add up to Development (June 22, 2006), available at http://www.oxfam.
org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060622_wto (questioning the benefit of offers
made by the European Union ("EU") and United States) (last visited May 18, 2008);
Antoine Bouit, Simon Mevel, & David Orden, More or Less Ambition in the Doha Round:
Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalisation with a Development Perspective, in THE WORLD
ECONOMY 1253 (2007) (describing how Doha outcomes are not guaranteed to be bene-
ficial for LDCs; rather, outcomes will depend on the specifics of the final negotiated
agreement); Thomas W. Hertel & Roman Keeney, What Is at Stake: The Relative Impor-
tance of Import Barriers, Export Subsidies, and Domestic Support, WORLD BANK, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/Ch2AgTrade
BookHertelKeeney.pdf (criticizing the idea that trade liberalization alone will aid least
developed countries); S. Kinnman & M. Lodefalk, Economic Implications of the Doha
Round (Swedish National Board of Trade, July 2006) (suggesting that the strongest re-
sults go to the developing countries, but warning that "[e]xcluding some elements of
liberalisation from the round may turn potential gains into losses, for some coun-
tries.").
6. Mr Mandelson, who referred to a development package for LDCs as "indispen-
sable," indicated at the Hong Kong World Trade Organization ("WTO") Ministerial
Conference that the EU had committed to step up annual spending on aid for trade to
two billion Euros by 2010. One billion of this will come from EU Member States, which
agreed at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference to the increase (from 400 million
Euros per year); the remainder will come from the European Commission. See, e.g.,
Gale, Cengage Learning, EU to More than Double Trade Aid to Developing Countries, Dec.
19, 2005 ("Europe did not come to Hong Kong empty-handed on aid for trade .. ");
Mariarosaria Iorio, The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and Aid for Trade: Finding
the Policy Link (International Gender and Trade Network, 2007) (analyzing, inter alia,
"the rationale and principles of Aid for Trade.").
7. For an analysis of the evolution of the world trading system, see generally Paul
Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade Or-
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global economic governance framework is needed. The Bretton
Woods institutions, which are outdated, need to be reformed
and improved.
This Article also argues that there remains substantial scope
for all BRIC countries (except for Russia, which is not yet a
member of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")) to make
further commitments towards greater liberalization within the
services sectors and within all modes of supply provided in the
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"). It will be
demonstrated that, despite the commitments made within the
GATS, services sectors still exhibit limitations that restrict equal
competition for foreign competitors, sometimes resulting in
non-compliance with the WTO doctrines of market access and
national treatment. Different WTO countries set different strat-
egies for services liberalization, reflected in their GATS or other
negotiating positions. Excessive use of non-tariff barriers" can
lead to ineffective enforcement of GATS commitments, resulting
in true market access lagging behind bound rates. Some coun-
tries keep a conservative position on their bound commitments,
while in reality a more liberal access is enjoyed, affording them
stronger leverage on future rounds of negotiation. A failure to
effectively enforce bound commitments can also reflect an in-
ability within a country to ensure uniform domestic implementa-
tion.9
It will also be argued that the attitude of the BRIC countries
toward multilateralism and responsibility in global economic
governance is questionable or unclear. For example, China and
Russia are already relatively powerful. India and Brazil, however,
want to become more important players; they seem to lean
against "traditional" powers (mainly the United States), and tend
ganization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123 (1995) (analyzing the evolution of the world
trading system).
8. Non-tariff barriers or non-tariff measures are "measures other than tariffs ap-
plied by governments at the border that determine the extent to which a good or ser-
vice has access to the import market." '"ALTER GOODE, DiCrioNARY OF TRADE POLICY
TERMS 309 (5th ed. 2007).
9. Among those who claim that there is potential for developing countries to bene-
fit from trade liberalization are Kym Anderson, Will Martin, & Dominique van der Men-
sbrugghe. See Will Martin, & Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Doha Merchandise Trade
Reform: What's at Stake for Developing Countries? (World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. WPS3848, 2006), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/de-
faul t/WDSCon ten tServer/ IW3P/ IB/ 2006/ 02/15/000016406_20060215164859/Ren-
dered/PDF/wps3848.pdf.
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to focus on South-South regionalism. Evidence of this is the tri-
lateral developmental initiative among India, Brazil, and South
Africa ("IBSA").l° It is therefore necessary to pave the way for
responsible multilateralism for the common goal, i.e., the estab-
lishment of peace, security, and prosperity in the twenty-first cen-
tury.
The EU has a long history of promoting regional integra-
tion in other parts of the world, especially among developing
countries. This is based on its own nature as the oldest and most
advanced regional scheme, coupled with the perception among
leading European policymakers that the EU does indeed consti-
tute a model for others.' The EU has therefore long viewed
itself as a "'natural' supporter of regional initiatives,"'" a view
that sparked the increasing externalization of its model over
time. This policy has become one of the cornerstones of the
EU's development policy, and the incentive of offering market
access to the EU's large internal market in support of such a
strategy has gained in salience in recent years. By promoting
regional integration, therefore, the EU actively influences emer-
gent forms of regional governance in other parts of the world.
The EU's main motivation for the promotion of regional
integration is predicated on trade and economic gains. Accord-
ing to this view, the EU needs to have important economic inter-
ests at stake in order to get involved in the integrative efforts of
other countries. These interests are two-fold. First, the EU pro-
motes the integration of national markets into regional econo-
10. The India, Brazil, South Africa ("IBSA") Dialogue Forum represents three im-
portant poles for galvanizing South-South cooperation and greater understanding be-
tween three important continents of the developing world namely, Africa, Asia, and
South America. The forum provides the three countries with a platform to engage in
discussions for cooperation in the field of agriculture, trade, culture, and defense,
among others. See, IBSA, About IBSA, http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org (last visited Oct.
24, 2008); see also IBSA, Brasilia Declaration, http://www.ibsa.nic.in/brasildeclaration.
htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
11. Rt. Hon. David Miliband, MP, Foreign Sec'y of the UK, Europe 2030: Model
Power Not Superpower, Remarks at the College of Europe, Bruges (Nov. 15, 2007)
("The EU . . .could be a model power of regional cooperation."); see also Romano
Prodi, President of the Eur. Comm'n, Eur. and Global Governance, Speech to the 2d
COMECE Congress, Brussels (Mar. 31, 2000) ("Imperfect though [the European
model] still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale .. .and I believe .. .that it
would also work globally.").
12. Commission Communicaton, COM (95) 219 Final, at 6 (1995) (Support for
Regional Economic Integration Efforts among Developing Countries).
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mies to benefit from economies of scale when supplying them
with EU goods. Second, through the negotiation of bi-regional
trade agreements, the EU has a powerful tool to shape the
framework of economic governance in counterpart regions.13
The EU has a lot to gain from the integration of small, frag-
mented markets into larger economic units in which EU prod-
ucts can circulate more easily. Market size has become an im-
portant criterion for investment and trade decisions by private
companies and serves as a strong incentive for European traders
and investors: "[T] he whole will grow faster than the sum of its
parts, offering outlets for our exports and opportunities for our
investors."' 4 This rationale is best reflected in the EU's new ap-
proach to integration in Africa through the negotiation of eco-
nomic partnership agreements ("EPAs"): 5 [T]hey "should deal
with all factors that constrain business activities in [African, Car-
ibbean, and Pacific] countries"16 through "the creation of open,
integrated regions sufficiently large to trigger economies of
scale, support trade and attract foreign investment." 17 Such a
strategy has been evaluated by one commentator as indicating
that it "is based upon securing market access for European pro-
ducers while selling the concept of the European 'model' of re-
gional integration."' As the creation of regional markets goes
hand in hand with the development of a regional economic gov-
ernance framework, the EU has an interest in being able to ac-
cess the enlarged market on terms that are favorable to its own
industry. Regional economic integration is an ongoing process
that is never complete. The EU has a comparative advantage to
13. See generally Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, The European Union as a Con-
flicted Trade Power, 13 J EUR. PUB. POL'Y 906 (2006) (examining underpinnings of EU's
formidable trade power).
14. Pascal Lamy, Regionalism and Multilateralism in Latin America, Speech Deliv-
ered at the Federa~do das Irdfistrias do Estado de Sdo Paulo (July 10, 2001).
15. Economic partnership agreements are "bilateral or plurilateral agreement[s].
The content of such agreements varies greatly. Some merely promote voluntary eco-
nomic cooperation between the partners. Others are proper free-trade agreements."
GOODE, supra note 8, at 145.
16. European Commission, manuscript for information brochure, Making Global-
isation Work for Everyone: The European Union and World Trade (2002).
17. European Commission, Trade Issues, Africa, Caribbean, Pacific. EPA Negotia-
tions: Toolbox, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/toolbox-en.
htm#top (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
18. Mary Farrell, The EU and Inter-Regional Cooperation: In Search of Global Presence?,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 19 (Amy Verdun & Erik Jones
eds., 2005).
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other such schemes as its integration process is the most ad-
vanced and it can therefore draw on its long experience in for-
mulating common rules to impact the economic integration pro-
cess of others.' 9
The research method used in this Article has been an inter-
disciplinary qualitative approach to the analysis of law, interna-
tional political economy, and international relations, thereby
moving away from the textual-formalistic reading of law. It is the
author's conviction that significant answers to legal questions
can be found only in a wider political, economic, and social con-
text.
This Article is divided into seven parts: after the Introduc-
tion and some general remarks, the Article will present the EU's
unilateral approach to international trade law in relation to the
BRIC countries, followed by the multilateral approach when
dealing with the BRIC countries in trade issues. Its bilateral/
regional approach to the NLPs follows, with an examination of
each of the BRIC countries, before the Conclusion.
I. GENERAL REMARKS
Why is trade important in the political arena? A trade
agreement is often considered to belong to a bilateral political
agreement, even if the scope might be rather limited (e.g., Asian
bilateralism). Trade is about money, and money is a powerful
instrument to foster political relations. Trade can be used as a
"carrot" or as a "stick." Trade can be used as a "carrot" when
preferences for certain countries create competitive advantages
versus third parties. This is not possible multilaterally due to the
most-favored-nation ("MFN") treatment. The MFN treatment
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") Article I,
GATS Article II, and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") Article 4), is the principle
of not discriminating between one's trading partners. In other
words, the MFN principle is about treating other WTO members
19. See generally Anne-Sophie Claeys & Alice Sindzingre, Regional Integration as a
Transfer of Rules: The Case of the Relationship Between the European Union and the
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Paper Presented to Develop-
ment Studies Association Annual Conference, Glasgow, University of Strathclyde (Sept.
10-12, 2003), available at http://www.edpsg.org/Documents/dp26.doc (observing that
"the EU has constituted a model of regional integration for a certain number of devel-
oping countries .... ").
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equally. Under the WTO Agreements, countries cannot nor-
mally discriminate between their trading partners. If you grant
someone a special favor (such as a lower customs duty rate for
one of their products), then you have to do the same for all
other WTO members.2 °
This principle, known as MFN treatment, is the core princi-
ple of the WTO Agreements. It is so important that it is the first
Article of the GATT, which governs trade in goods. MFN is also
a priority in the GATS (Article II) and the TRIPS Agreement
(Article 4), although in each agreement the principle is handled
slightly differently. 21 Some exceptions are allowed, namely the
so-called enabling clause 22 and the preferential tariff treatment
for least-developed countries. 23 For example, countries can set
up a free-trade agreement24 that applies only to goods traded
within the group-discriminating against goods from outside.
Or, countries can give developing countries special access to
their markets. Or, a country can raise barriers against products
that are considered to be traded unfairly from specific countries.
In the case of services, countries are allowed, in limited circum-
stances, to discriminate. The agreements, however, only permit
these exceptions under strict conditions. In general, MFN
means that every time a WTO country lowers a trade barrier or
opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or services
from all its trading partners-whether rich or poor, weak or
strong.
20. See, GOODE, supra note 8, at 285-86 (explaining the most-favored-nation
("MFN") principle).
21. Together, those three Agreements cover all three main areas of trade handled
by the IANTO.
22. See Decision, Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Par-
ticipation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), available at http://www.wto.
int/english/docsse/legal_e/tokyo-enablinge.pdf ("Notwithstanding the provisions of
Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and
more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment
to other contracting parties.").
23. See Decision on Waiver, Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least Developed Countries,
1, A/L/304 (June 15, 1999) ("[T]he provisions of paragraph I of Article I of the
GATT 1994 shall be waived until 30 June 2009, to the extent necessary to allow develop-
ing country Members to provide preferential tariff treatment to products of least-devel-
oped countries .... ").
24. A free-trade agreement is "a contractual arrangement between two or more
countries under which they give each other preferential market access, usually called
free trade. In practice, free-trade agreements tend to allow for all sorts of exceptions
... to cover sensitive products." GOODE, supra note 8, at 181.
2009] THE EUROPEAN UNION AMD NEW LEADING POWERS 353
Certain exceptions25 are, however, envisaged in the context
of specific service activities within the framework of a list of ex-
emptions from the MFN requirement. Work on this subject
started in 2000. When the GATS came into force in 1995, WTO
members were allowed a once-only opportunity to take an ex-
emption from the MFN principle of non-discrimination between
a member's trading partners. The measure for which the ex-
emption was taken is described in a member's MFN exemption
list, indicating to which member the more favorable treatment
applies, and specifying its duration. In principle, these exemp-
tions should not last for more than ten years. As mandated by
the GATS, all these exemptions are currently being reviewed to
examine whether the conditions which created the need for
these exemptions in the first place still exist. And in any case,
they are part of the current services negotiations. In fact, each
government has included in its schedule the services for which it
guarantees access to its market by setting out the limits it wishes
to maintain for such access.
Trade can also be used as a "stick." For example: (1) To
deny preferences to a certain country when granting them to
others, thereby creating discrimination and trade diversion; (2)
Through trade defense instruments26 such as antidumping and
safeguard measures; (3) The WTO dispute settlement system.
As we will see later, trade agreements often include some
non-trade policy objectives. This is the case of cooperation
agreements that relate to sustainable development, human
rights, good governance, et cetera. These agreements are usually
aimed at lesser-developed countries. Examples of cooperation
agreements27 are the Andean Pact (today Andean Community) 21
25. Exceptions are binding provisions on all signatories built into the core text of
an agreement that lists the circumstances when a country may violate a term of an
agreement without penalty. Exceptions only come into play as a defense when a coun-
try's law or policy has been challenged in a dispute resolution as a violation of an agree-
ment.
26. Trade defense instruments, also known as contingent protections, are "protec-
tive mechanisms ... that are legal under the WTO agreements. They may be triggered
to counter the effects of dumping, subsidies, and unexpected import surges causing
injury to domestic industry. Such mechanisms include anti-dumping measures, coun-
tervailing duties and safeguards." GoODE, supra note 8, at 101.
27. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision
Concerning the Conclusion of a Framework Cooperation Agreement Between the Eu-
ropean Economic Community and the Andean Pact, COM (92) 463 Final (Nov. 13,
1992).
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as well as the Association of South-East Asian Nations
("ASEAN") 29 in 1980. Agreements were also designed to help
some Asian countries address problems arising from the loss of
certain preferences from the Commonwealth."° This was the
case with India,3" Pakistan,32 Sri Lanka,33 and Bangladesh. 4
In the case of the EU's neighborhood, there were clear for-
eign policy objectives. With Eastern Europe, there was a strong
role of trade policy in fostering foreign policy objectives. The re-
integration of Eastern Europe into the EU has been facilitated
by offering access to a huge market. With other countries in the
European neighborhood, similar but not equally large economic
incentives are offered in order to attain foreign policy goals such
as security, stability, and peace. This is the case of North Africa
and the Middle East.
28. The Andean Community is a trade bloc comprising until recently five South
American countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In 2006, Vene-
zuela announced its withdrawal, reducing the Andean Community to four member
states. The trade bloc was called the Andean Pact until 1996, and came into existence
with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement in 1969. Its headquarters are located in
Lima, Peru. See Comunidad Andina: About Us, http://www.comunidadandina.org/in-
gles/quienes/brief.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (providing brief history of Andean
Coummunity).
29. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") is composed of ten
members. The five Founding Countries of ASEAN are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, and Thailand. The rest of the countries are Brunei, Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar, and Vietnam. "[T] he aims and purposes of the Association are: (1) To ac-
celerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and
(2) To promote regional peace and stability .... ." Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, Overview, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
30. The implementation of the "declaration of intent" does not require the con-
clusion of any agreement. See ASEAN-EEC Joint Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, (Mar. 7,
1980), http://www.aseansec.org/1500.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
31. See Council Regulation No. 3113/84, O.J. L 292/1, at 5 (1984) ("Agreement in
the Form of an Exchange of Letters Between the European Economic Community and
the Republic of India on the Guaranteed Prices for Cane Sugar for the 1984/85 Deliv-
ery Period.").
32. See Council Regulation No. 1196/86, O.J. L 108/1 (1986) ("On the Conclusion
of the Agreement for Commercial, Economic and Development Cooperation Between
the European Economic Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.").
33. Council Decision No. 90/537/EEC, O.J. L 301/1 (1990) ("Council Decision
of 27 July 1990 Concerning the Conclusion of the Agreement Between the European
Economic Community and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka on Trade in
Textile Products.").
34. One early agreement with Bangladesh was on commercial cooperation. See
Council Regulation No. 2785/76, O.J. L 19/1 (1976) ("On the Conclusion of the Com-
mercial Cooperation Agreement Between the European Community and the People's
Republic of Bangladesh.").
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This Article will next tackle the three legal instruments or
types of liberalization used by the EU: unilateralism, multilater-
alism, and bilateralism/regionalism.
II. UNILATERALISM
The focus of attention in this Section is to see whether the
EU can increase cooperation and establish trust through unilat-
eral liberalization. In purely economic terms, unilateral MFN
liberalization is in the interest of each country. However, trade
liberalization in political-economic terms is seen as a concession
and is resisted by import substitution35 industries. This means
that unilateral MFN liberalization on a broad scale is often not
very viable for the EU.
When looking at bilateral political relations, we note that
unilateral liberalization could work as a "carrot" to the benefit of
the country in question. Given that only one country benefits,
this is politically more feasible. Unilateral liberalization could
also work as a "stick" because withdrawal is possible at any time.
The EU already uses unilateral preferences. An example is
the everything-but-arms initiative,3 6 which provides the most
favorable treatment of all EU unilateral initiatives, granting the
least-developed countries ("LDCs") 7 duty-free and quota-free
35. Import substitution is "a policy for the development of a domestic productive
capacity in goods and services to reduce or displace imports, often with the expectation
of increases in employment and reductions in the current account deficit." GOODE,
supra note 8, at 222.
36. Council Regulation No. 416/2001/EEC (2001). This regulation grants duty-
free access to imports of all products from least developed countries without any quanti-
tative restrictions, except to arms and munitions.
37. The LDCs are the forty-nine poorest nations in the world, often disproportion-
ately experiencing the negative effects of corporate globalization. These forty-nine rec-
oguized countries, as defined by the United Nations, are deemed structurally handi-
capped in their development process, facing more than other developing countries the
risk of failing to come out of poverty as a result of these handicaps, and in need of the
highest degree of consideration from the international community in support of their
development efforts. Numerous indicators can be used to illustrate that these are really
the poorest nations on earth, such as their increasing marginalization in the world
economy, as reflected in their tiny share of world exports. Although they make up
around 10% of the world's population, LDCs account for less than 0.5% of world ex-
ports. In 1980, their share was 0.8%. "LLDC" is sometimes used for "least-developed
countries" in opposition to "LDC," which then stands for "less-developed countries."
An empirical study that explains the difficulties of these nations in the world trading
system is Chakriya Bowman, Case Study 33, The Pacizfic Island Nations: Towards Shared
Representation, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF "717O PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES,
(Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low, & Andrew Stoler eds., 2005), available at http://www.
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access to the EU market. Another EU unilateral mechanism is
the preferential treatment given to the African, Caribbean and
Pacific ("ACP") countries,3 8 although neither one of these pro-
grams is applicable to the BRIC countries. The original Treaty
of Rome ("EEC Treaty")39 contained guidelines about external
relations. First, the EEC Treaty established a special regime for
development aid and cooperation, which initially aided develop-
ing countries that had a long-standing relationship (mostly for-
mer colonies) with founding Member States.4" This regime was
further developed through the Yaound6 and Lom6 Conventions,
which linked seventy developing countries to the European Eco-
nomic Community ("EEC").41
In this sense, we see that one of the main reasons for inter-
national negotiations between the then EEC and third-parties
was the historic link between the various Member States of the
EEC and overseas territories or dependencies. Shortly after the
establishment of the EEC, there was an important transforma-
tion in the links between these countries and the common mar-
ket, which, according to Part IV of the EEC Treaty, consisted of a
two-way free access for each other's products and a special EEC
aid program. To address the issue of access for these countries,
wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/casestudiese/case33_e.htm#fntextIO (last visited
Nov. 4, 2008).
38. Such unilateral measures certainly do not help multilaterally. In July 2008,
Ecuador threatened to sidetrack the WTO mini-ministerial conference that took place
in July 2008, whose aim was to give a final push to the Doha Round, unless an agree-
ment on banana tariffs was reached to reduce the preferential treatment that the Euro-
pean Community ("EC") has been offering the African, Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP")
countries. See generally Eric J. Lyman & Daniel Pruzin, Ecuador Ready to Block Doha Deal
Until Banana Feud Resolved, ITO REP. (July 23, 2008). However, on July 26, 2008,
[E]leven Latin American banana exporters and the U.S.... reached an agree-
ment with the EU on the latter's import regime for bananas.... [Biased on a
proposal by [Pascal] Lamy, the EC would cut its MFN tariffs on bananas.., by
the beginning of 2016 .... The pact would exempt the EU from having to cut
banana tariffs under a Doha [Round].
WIO Members Move Forward on Bananas, Tropical Products, but Major Differences Loom,
BRIDCES DAILY UPDATE, July 28, 2008, http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/07/daily-up-
date-issue-8.pdf.
39. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
40. Bernard Martenczuk, Cooperation with Developing and Other Third Countries: Ele-
ments of a Community Foreign Policy, in EXTERNAL ECONOMic RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POL-
ICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 385-417 (Stefan Griller & Brigit Weidel eds., 2002).
41. See Hugo Paemen, The European Union in International Affairs: Recent Develop-
ments, 22 FORDHAM Irr'L L.J. 136, 138 (1999).
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the Yaound6 Convention was held.4
2
The Yaound6 Convention took place with eighteen African
States and Madagascar.43 After the first enlargement of the
Community, the whole system was renegotiated (in 1973/1974)
with nearly fifty countries (all the former dependencies of the
United Kingdom ("UK") in Africa, the Pacific, and the Carib-
bean). In 1975, the Lom6 Convention, between the EEC and
this group of countries, introduced new ideas such as the organi-
zation of commercial and industrial cooperation and the stabili-
zation of export earnings. 44
The Yaound6 Conventions linked the EEC to African States,
providing, inter alia, financial and technical assistance for eco-
nomic development. Two important examples are the Conven-
tion of Association between the EEC and Associated African
States, of July 20, 1963, 4" and the Convention of Association be-
tween the EEC and Associated African States, of July 29, 1969.46
With reference to the Lom6 Conventions, there have been four
additional agreements negotiated, the African, Caribbean, and
42. See Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community
and Associated African States, July 20, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 971 (1963) [hereinafter First Ya-
ound6 Convention]. It was on January 1, 1971, that the Second Yaound6 Convention
entered into force (eighteen African countries) as well as the Arusha Convention
(three Eastern African countries), and the Council Decision concerning the association
of the EC Member States' overseas territories. See Convention of Association Between
the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States Associated
with that Community, July 29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 484 (1970) [hereinafter Second Yaound6
Convention]; Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic
Community and the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda and the
Republic of Kenya, Sept. 24, 1969, OJ. L 282/80 (1970); Council Decision No. 70/595,
O.J. L 282/83 (1970).
43. See, e.g., Rafael Leal-Arcas, Unitary Character of EC External Trade Relations, 7
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 335, 364 (2001). For example, an agreement between the European
Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar
regarding fishing off the coast of Madagascar was signed some years later. See Agree-
ment Between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Madagascar on Fishing Off Madagascar, Jan. 28, 1986, OJ. L 73/26
(1986).
44. See Kurt M. Rozelsky, European Economic Communities-Environmental Policy-Le-
gal Basis and International Implications of Council Regulation on the Supervision of Shipments
of Hazardous Waste, 23 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111, 129 n.125 (1993) (citing African,
Caribbean, and Pacific Countries-European Economic Community Convention, Feb.
28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 595 (1975) [hereinafter Lom6 I]). Itwas on February 28, 1975 that
the signature of the so-called Lom6 I took place between the EEC and 46 ACP coun-
tries. See id.
45. See generally First Yaound6 Convention, supra note 42.
46. See generally Second Yaound6 Convention, supra note 42.
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Pacific Countries-European Economic Community Convention
("ACP-EEC Convention"), of February 28, 1975,47 the second
ACP-EEC Convention, of October 31, 1979,48 the third ACP-EEC
Convention, of December 8, 1984, 4  and the fourth ACP-EEC
Convention, of December 1, 1989.50 Thanks to these Conven-
tions,5 1 over ninety-nine percent of these countries' imports en-
joy free access to the EU.52
Another unilateral tool used by the EU is the Generalized
47. See generally Lom4 I, supra note 44. The ACP was formed when the first Lom6
Convention was signed with the European Economic Community ("EEC") in 1975. In
2002, it encompassed seventy-eight states (forty-eight African states, sixteen Caribbean
states, fourteen Pacific states), which all have preferential trading relation with the EEC.
See African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP Group), Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.acpsec.org/en/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008); see also ACP
Group, Member States, http://www.acpsec.org/en/acpstates.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2008).
48. Second ACP-EEC Convention, opened for signature Oct. 31, 1979, 1277 U.N.T.S.
348 [hereinafter Lom6 II].
49. Third ACP-EEC Convention, opened for signature Dec. 8, 1984, 1922 U.N.T.S. 4
[hereinafter Lom6 III].
50. Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1989, 1924 U.N.T.S.
4 [hereinafter Lom6 IV].
51. Not everyone is of the view that Economic Partnership Agreements ("EPAs")
are fair or beneficial for ACP countries. See Paul Orengoh, East Africa: EPA Controversy
Continues, TRADE LAW CENTRE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, May 29, 2007, http://www.tralac.
org/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause dir news item&causeid=1694&newsid=42422&cat_
id=1211; Ronald Sanders, A New Colonialism? EU Trade Demands and ACP Countries,
HUNTINGTON NEWS, June 16, 2007, http://www.huntingtonnews.net/columns/070616-
sanders-columnseutrade.html.
52. It is worth noting that there are future EPAs. See, e.g., Lillian Crawford-Abben-
setts, Andrea Ewart & Rolande Pryce, The Caribbean, 41 INT'L LAw. 765, 772 (2007) ("In
response to WTO determinations that this preferential regime violated WTO rules, in
2000 the EU and ACP countries launched negotiations to re-establish trade relations on
a reciprocal basis by replacing the Lom6 Convention with Economic Partnership Agree-
ments.., within each region of the ACP." (citations omitted)). These agreements were
done in the framework of the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements. For in-
stance, the ACP countries and the EC have agreed to enter into economic integration
agreements-concluding new WTO-compatible trading arrangements, progressively re-
moving barriers to trade among them, and enhancing cooperation in all areas related
to trade. To this end, EPAs will be negotiated with ACP regions engaged in a regional
economic integration process. EPAs are thus intended to consolidate regional integra-
tion initiatives within the ACP. They are also aimed at providing an open, transparent,
and predictable framework for goods and services to circulate freely, thus increasing
competitiveness of the ACP and ultimately facilitating the transition towards their full
participation in a liberalizing world economy-thereby complementing any initiative
taken in the multilateral context. Formal negotiations started in September 2002 and
EPAs entered into force on January 1, 2008 at the latest. The non-reciprocal Lom6 IV
trade preferences continued to be applied during the interim period (2000-07).
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System of Preferences ("GSP"),53 a vital tool of the EC's pro-de-
velopment trade policy. 54 This is a multilaterally agreed instru-
ment, where the BRIC countries are beneficiaries. However,
tariff reductions are generally not very meaningful because of
preference margins not being very large, because of sensitive
goods, graduation for product groups where competitiveness has
increased, or restrictive rules of origin. Recently, though, "[a] s a
result of re-calculations to reflect the evolution of [interna-
tional] trade, preferences for specific product groups will be re-
established for six beneficiary countries of the GSP (Algeria, In-
dia, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand).""
It is interesting to note that, although the EU also offers a
special incentive arrangement to foster sustainable development
and good governance, called the GSP Plus incentive system,56
none of the BRIC countries want to be part of it, presumably
because they do not like conditionality. So would it make sense
53. The idea of granting developing countries preferential tariff rates in the mar-
kets of industrialized countries was originally presented by Raul Prebisch, the first Sec-
retary-General of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD"), at the first UNCTAD conference in 1964. Kevin Moss, The Consequences of
the WTO Appellate Body Decision in EC-Tariff Preferences for the African Growth Opportunity
Act and Sub-Saharan Africa, 38 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. & POL. 665, 669 (2005-06). The Genera-
lized System of Preferences ("GSP") was adopted at UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968.
Dionysia-Theodora Avgerinopoulou, Legislative Development: Implementation and Enforce-
ment of Multilateral Environmental Agreements-The New EC Generalized System of Preferences
Scheme, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 827, 829 (2005-06); see generally Kel Onyejekwe, Interna-
tional Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from the European Union and the United States, 26
ST. MARY'S LJ. 425, 44749 (1994-95) (outlining evolution of preferential economic
trade agreements under UNCTAD).
54. See Oren Perez, Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation: Ex-
ploring the Role of the WTO, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 735, 761 (2005).
55. Commission Press Release, European Union Maintains Trade Preferences for
Developing Countries, July 23, 2008, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/139873.
htm.
56. To benefit from the GSP Plus scheme, countries need to demonstrate that
their economies are poorly diversified, and therefore dependent and vulnerable. They
also need to have ratified and effectively implemented the sixteen core conventions on
human and labor rights and seven (out of eleven) of the conventions related to good
governance and the protection of the environment. At the same time, beneficiary
countries must commit themselves to ratifying and effectively implementing the inter-
national conventions which they have not yet ratified. In any case, the twenty-seven
conventions have to be ratified by the beneficiary couatries by December 31, 2008. See
generally Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP+ Arrangement, 10 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 869, 871 (2007) (describing requirements for GSP Plus qualification). For the list of
conventions to qualify for the GSP Plus scheme, see Commission Press Release, GSP:
The New Preferential Market Access System for Developing Countries, June 23, 2005,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/123861.htm.
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to create a new unilateral instrument? Not really, since the polit-
ical resistance for competition from the BRIC countries would
probably be strong, particularly with regard to China and Brazil
when it comes to agriculture.
III. MULTILATERALISM
The question to ask is how to foster more constructive mul-
tilateralism by using a trade policy approach. The Doha
Round57 was the result of widespread agreement among dele-
gates at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha that it
was time to address the imbalances of previous rounds and to
offer developing countries the prospect of trade talks which they
could see were to their benefit.58 Although wealth redistribution
seems to be vital to truly help the poor nations of the world, the
author agrees with WTO Director-General Lamy that the WTO's
role is not about redistribution of wealth. So a new Round was
necessary to include poor countries in the world trading system,
and to promote economic development, as well as to alleviate
poverty.59
The WTO members are currently negotiating the Doha De-
velopment Agenda ("DDA").6 ° A successful result of the DDA
57. For a summary of the current Doha Round of trade negotiations, see RAFAEL
LEAL-ARcAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EC EXTERNAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY 486-500
(2008) [hereinafter LEAL-ARcAS, EC EXTERNAL TRADE LAw].
58. For an overview of the Doha Round, see generally Sungjoon Cho, Doha's Devel-
opment, 25 BERRELEYJ. INT'L L. 165 (2007).
59. This is certainly the position of former EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandel-
son, who said at a Party of European Socialists conference in Brussels on Decent Work
that far from being responsible for poor labor conditions, free trade could be a ladder
out of poverty and "an engine of the very prosperity that helps societies put poor labour
conditions behind them for good." Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, Free
Trade Is Not the Enemy of Decent Work, Speaking Points at Party of European Social-
ist's Conference (May 10, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/commission-barroso/ashton/
speeches-articles/sppm098_en.htm. He concluded: "The enemy of decent work is our
willingness to turn a blind eye to it. Free trade does not mean trade indifferent to fair
conditions of production." Id.
60. Interestingly, rich countries call this agenda of negotiations the "Doha Devel-
opment Agenda," whereas poor countries refer to it as the "Everything but Develop-
ment Round." See, e.g., Chakravarthi Raghavan, An Everything But Development Round
from Doha, SUNS-SOUTH-NORTH DEVELOPMENT MONITOR, Nov. 16, 2001 http://www.
twnside.org.sg/title/twe268a.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). It has certainly been a
mistake to call this round the "development round," since the DDA is a multilateral
trade negotiation with very little input on development. Id. This rather vague distinc-
tion between rich and poor countries is based on the World Bank's country classifica-
tion. See The World Bank Data & Statistics, Country Classification, http://web.world
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will mean more growth and development in the world trading
system. A sensu contrario, failure of the DDA will imply no growth
or development for the world, especially the poorest countries
on the planet. In addition, the failure of the DDA will be re-
garded as a missed historic opportunity to eliminate export sub-
sidies, to put an end to trade distortion. Consequently, all coun-
tries of the world trading system will lose, especially developing
countries. With a successful result, the biggest gains to develop-
ment will certainly be in the core areas of goods, services and
agriculture, and so liberalizing trade among developing coun-
tries is an essential part of the Doha exercise.6" That is why the
international community cannot miss the opportunity offered by
the DDA, which can set a vision for the global economy for the
next decades and make a major contribution to development.
Many deadlines for the conclusion of the Doha Round have
been missed. In my opinion, the main actors to blame are the
EC and the U.S., based on their own selfishness. Others blame
India and especially China for the failure to conclude the Doha
Round in July 2008.62 There has been lack of progress or very
slow progress of the Doha round, which has brought generalized
frustration to the world trading system. There are multiple rea-
sons for the lack of progress: disagreement over major issues
(such as agriculture), national elections in major WTO members
(for example, the United States in 2008, India in 2009), as well
as the unclear definition of the term "development" in the Doha
Round. Moreover, since lack of trust seems to be an important
impediment toward progress in the Doha Round, bilateral dia-
logues as well as more intensive and broader political coopera-
tion between the EU and Brazil/India/China may establish new
trust. In this sense, it is worth noting that during the Doha
Round, various Strategic Partnerships between the EU and some
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458-menu
PK64133156-pagePK64133150-piPK.64133175-theSitePK:239419,00.html (last visited
Mar. 20, 2008).
61. As we saw in the pre-Hong Kong Ministerial Conference period of negotia-
tions, the agriculture negotiations are considered key to the success of the overall Doha
Round of 'rO talks. See generally Matthew Newell, Note, Cotton, US. Domestic Policy, and
Trade Wars: The Future of WTO Agriculture Negotiations, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 301
(2005) (arguing agricultural negotiations carry large impact on the ongoing Doha
Round).
62. See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
15 (2008).
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of the BRIC countries have taken place.63
In this context, what role do the New Leading Powers play
multilaterally? How can the EU engage with them to foster the
DDA? Some of the BRIC countries play an increasingly impor-
tant role at the WTO. They have attained a global reach in trade
policy since the Canctin WTO Ministerial Conference in Septem-
ber 2003. Because major divides exist among the various WTO
members in relation to what the WTO's future agenda should
comprise, the Doha Ministerial conference text put off all the
major decisions until the following WTO Ministerial conference
in Cancin, whose principal aim was to present an overview of
the progress of the negotiations in the framework of the DDA.
In Canctin, talks were intended to forge agreement on the Doha
Round's objectives but collapsed due to a strong North-South
divide on agricultural issues.6 4 Developing nations gained in
strength, forming two new negotiating groups-the G-20,6 5 con-
sisting of middle-income developing countries, and the G-906 6
group of poorer developing countries-and finally rejecting the
deal that they viewed as unfavorable.
Evidence of the fact that some of the BRIC countries are
63. See Commission of the European Communities, Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic
Partnership, COM (2007) 281 Final (May 2007) [hereinafter Towards EU-Brazil Part-
nership], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2007:0281:FIN:EN:PDF (Brazil); Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establish-
ing a Partnership Between the European Communities and their Member States, of the
One Part, and the Russian Federation, of the Other Part, June 24, 1994, O.J. L 327/3
(1997) (Russia); Commission of the European Communities, An EU-India Strategic
Partnership, COM (2004) 430 Final (June 2004), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0430:FIN:EN:PDF (India); Agreement on
Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and
the People's Republic of China, May 21, 1985, O.J. L 250/2 (1985) (China).
64. See Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al; Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free
Trade: Critical Reflections on Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAzA L.J. 65, 73-74
(2006) (explaining North-South dichotomy and reason for Canctsn talk breakdown).
65. The Group of 20, or G-20, is a group of developing countries focused on tear-
ing down industrialized countries' barriers to agricultural trade. In March 2006, the
group included twenty-three countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba,
Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and
Zimbabwe. See G-20, Members, http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/members.asp (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008).
66. The G-90 is a tripartite alliance of the African Union ("AU"), the ACP Group
and LDCs, forming a majority of developing countries in the IWTrO. See Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations, Negotiating Coalitions, http://www.fao-
loge.ch/coalitionsen.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
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increasingly playing important roles multilaterally is in the G-20,
where Brazil and India seem to act as leaders.67 In the G-4, Bra-
zil and India are now members (with the United States and the
European Community ("EC")) and have replaced Japan and Ca-
nada in this small circle. As for China in the WTO, it seems to
have a strong interest, but is active only behind the scenes, which
is rather surprising compared to India's or Brazil's attitude at
the WTO. It is expected of China to assume more multilateral
responsibility and behave multilaterally as pro-actively as other
new leading powers such as India and Brazil. Russia is not yet a
member of the WTO. The EU has readily accepted the new
prominent role of Brazil and India and engages constructively
with them multilaterally.
The EU pushes for a successful and ambitious Doha Round
since it believes that it is both in the interests of the EU and the
wider global economy. Moreover, the EU believes that a deal in
which all WTO members contribute based on their capacities
would:
[S] trengthen the multilateral [trading] system and the WTO
by bringing the new rising powers into a trade deal as core
contributors for the first time; [it would] provide a shot of
confidence in a highly uncertain global economy; [it would]
create valuable new economic growth in the global economy,
which can contribute to new trade for EU companies,job cre-
ation and greater competitiveness; [and finally, it would] re-
move important distortions in global farm trade that in many
cases currently create unfair pressure on farming in the devel-
oping world.68
So what is required from the EU to conclude the DDA? Ag-
ricultural liberalization seems to be the key issue.69 Efforts to
reach a preliminary agreement on the crucial Doha Trade
67. This new phenomenon of India and Brazil playing hardball at the WTO is
clearly explained in FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POsT-AMERICAN WORLD 37 (2008).
68. European Commission, Trade Issues, Doha Development Agenda, Doha WrO Min-
iterial, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/doha-da/genevaO8/index-en.
htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
69. Pascal Lamy, on May 29, 2008, told the Committee of International Trade of
the European Parliament that the world, and in particular the European Union, has a
major stake in the conclusion of the Doha Round. Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the
rrO, Speech to the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (May 29,
2008), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/sppl90-e.htm. In Pascal Lamy's
view, the solution to the current situation in the world does not lie in protectionism. Id.
364 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:345
Round have stalled on the issue of agricultural subsidies and tar-
iffs. The big trading blocs in the WTO (the United States, Bra-
zil, and Australia on one side, and the EC on the other) had
been engaged in a tit-for-tat struggle,7" each refusing to accept
that offers of subsidy cuts from the others had gone far enough.
The G-20 is demanding heavier cuts from both sides. It is inter-
esting to see the differences of opinion between the G-20's
strong stance on eliminating agricultural subsidies and the then-
EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson's statement that while
there was a need for an ambitious Doha Round outcome, focus-
ing on agriculture alone would be counter-productive. Brazil's
foreign minister, Celso Amorim, argued that:
[P]ositive and concrete indications, on the part of the devel-
oped countries, early on, about the key elements of the agri-
cultural negotiations are indispensable to set the tone for a
positive dynamic on all areas of [the] negotiations .... He
pointed to unresolved issues beyond the gaps on trade-dis-
torting subsidies, such as the speed with which tariff cuts
would be phased in, tariff capping, and a potential provision
in the draft agriculture text (Paragraph 80) that would allow
countries to create tariff quotas for products for which none
currently exist, which he said would create 'a zone of indeter-
mination.71
In response to a U.S. offer to cut farming subsidies by sixty
percent, the EC had offered to reduce its tariffs on agricultural
goods by, on average, thirty-eight percent-an insufficient figure
in the eyes of the United States and the developing countries.
The EC, however, was driven by internal conflict, with France
accusing then-Commissioner Mandelson of exceeding his man-
date to negotiate on behalf of the EU. 2 To prove the lack of
trust that EU Member States tend to have toward the Commis-
sion, let us remember that on February 18, 2008, after rejecting
70. Tit-for-tat is the modus operandi in international trade. For example, Country A
raises barriers on Product X because Country B did it to Product Y.
71. Political Positioning Dominates Opening Day of WTO Talks, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE,
July 22, 2008, http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/07/bridges-daily-update-22-july.pdf.
72. It is interesting to observe the French fixation on agriculture, given the small
percentage that it represents on France's GDP. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
THE 2008 WORLD FACrOOK: FRANCE (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). The argument of a
French political obligation to look after France's farmers seems evident, but is it
macroeconomically justified?
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the revised draft proposals for agriculture, industry, and services
trade in the framework of the Doha Round, France's Minister
for Agriculture, along with nineteen other EU ministers for agri-
culture, showed once again their lack of trust toward the Euro-
pean Commission in trade negotiations. Whereas for former EU
Trade Commissioner Mandelson the agricultural proposal forms
"a good basis for further negotiations," 3 the views of France's
Agriculture Minister, Michel Barnier, were that the text in agri-
culture was "totally unbalanced between concessions . ..and
other issues like services, industry or geographical indications,
where we see no progress."74 France's rejection of the draft
comes as no real surprise after years of intense lobbying against
any large tariff and subsidy cuts, since France fears that the draft
could destroy its farming sector.7 5 However, the fact that the re-
jection of the draft has the backing of so many other EU Mem-
bers States could signal bad news for the Doha talks.
Turning now to the BRIC countries, what is required from
them to conclude the Doha Round? An immediate reaction
would be that the BRIC countries should be prepared to accept
more responsibility for the multilateral system, i.e., they should
hide less behind the status of a developing country and stand up
to their own ambition to new leadership. This is certainly true in
the case of China. However, the term "development" is not
clearly defined in the Doha Round. If the Doha Round is con-
cluded, certainly Brazil, China, and India will greatly benefit
from better access to developed countries' markets and to each
other's markets. However, this may happen partly at the ex-
pense of other poorer developing countries.
"In recent months, the U.S. and the EU have by and large
stopped [criticizing] each other on agricultural trade. Instead,
they have turned their fire on developing countries like Brazil,
India, and China, blaming [those countries'] resistance on in-
dustrial tariff cuts for the impasse in the negotiations."76 To
73. Posting of Keith Good to FarmPolicy.com, Twenty EU Members Cool to Latest
WTO Farm Text, http://www.farmpolicy.com/?p=628 (February 19, 2008, 05:28 CST).
74. See EurActiv.com, France Rallies EU Partners Against World Trade Pact (Feb.
19, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/france-rallies-eu-partners-world-trade-
pact/article-170401 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
75. See id.
76. Geneva Mini-Ministerial: "Now or Never"for Real this Time?, BRIDGES DAILY UP-
DATE, July 21, 2008, http://ictsd.net/i/wto/englishupdates/12911/.
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prove this point, in his statement to the Trade Negotiations
Committee during the July 2008 WTO Mini-Ministerial Confer-
ence, David Shark, a U.S. trade official, took aim at India and
China for "insisting on the ability to raise agricultural tariffs in
violation of their current WTO commitments, and firmly refus-
ing to take part in sector-specific liberalization initiatives for in-
dustrial machinery, electronics, and chemicals."77
The BRIC countries should also accept greater differentia-
tion among developing countries in the WTO and lower market
barriers vis-A-vis poorer developing countries. In this sense, the
former EU trade chief expects a proactive role of the New Lead-
ing Powers:
"A limited number of developing countries must accept tariff
cuts imposed by a NAMA coefficient," [Peter Mandelson]
told the [Trade Negotiations Committee at the WTO], refer-
ring to Brazil, China, India, and the rest of the 30-odd rela-
tively larger developing countries required to use the stan-
dard tariff reduction formula. "They must be real. These
cuts must provide some new market access in practice. That
is the political bottom line. Nothing else will work for us.
Nothing else will close the deal."78
A. WVTO Mini-Ministerial Conference of July 2008
Governments' latest attempt to salvage a deal in the Doha
Round broke down on July 29, 2008, as ministers acknowledged
that they were unable to reach a compromise after nine days of a
WTO mini-ministerial summit.79 This was due to an increase in
tariffs by developing countries to protect farmers from import
surges under a special safeguard mechanism.8 ° Import-sensitive
China and India were pitted against the United States' demands
for predictable market access for farm products. A rational ex-
77. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
78. Political Positioning Dominates Opening Day of WTO Talks, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE,
July 22, 2008, http://ictsd.net/i/wto/englishupdates/13365/.
79. Joseph Olanyo, WTO Boss Ready to Call Ministers Back to Geneva, MONITOR DAILY,
Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/business/WTObossready
to call-ministersback_toGeneva_71679.shtml.
80. A special safeguard mechanism is a system available under the WTO Agree-
ment on Agriculture to WTO members that have converted non-tariff measures to tariff
protection. It allows WTO members to impose additional tariffs on agricultural prod-
ucts if import volumes exceed defined trigger levels or if import prices fall below de-
fined trigger prices. See GOODE, supra note 8, at 396.
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planation for the failure of the multilateral trade talks is that
countries such as India want to protect their poor and subsis-
tence farmers, while the United States and the EC negotiators
are under pressure from powerful farm lobbies."1
According to Pascal Lamy, trade ministers that participated
in the mini-ministerial conference "were very close to finalizing
modalities in agriculture and [non-agricultural market access]"8 2
in the framework of deals governing tariff and subsidy cuts that
governments had hoped to strike. "He said that 'a huge amount
of problems which had remained intractable for years have
found solutions,' even though the talks ultimately ran aground
on the extent to which developing countries would be able to
protect farmers from import surges under a special safeguard
mechanism."83
That said, although the mini-ministerial conference was go-
ing to focus on agriculture and industrial goods, trade in services
is a central part of any final Doha Agreement. At the mini-minis-
terial there was a signaling conference, in which WTO members
indicated where and how they planned to improve access to
their services markets for other WTO members. It was under-
stood that, while the signals exchanged were important in mea-
suring progress, they would not represent the final outcome of
the negotiations. They would instead provide comfort to WTO
members by reflecting real progress in the services negotia-
tions.8 4 In this sense, officials from several countries expressed
satisfaction with the signaling conference on services trade liber-
81. See WfO Mini-Ministerial Ends in Collapse, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE, July 30, 2008,
http://ictsd.net/i/wto/englishupdates/ 15315/ (describing how India was focused on
setting up special safeguards to protect its farmers from the surges of subsidized food
imports); Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, Doha: Why the Key to its Success Lies in
Washington, VoxEU Centre for Economic Policy Research, (July 9, 2007), http://www.
voxeu.org/index.php?q=ndde/371 (describing how the United States was under pres-
sure from strong U.S. farm lobbies that would not permit reduction in the substantial
U.S. subsidies without "sectoral reciprocity," that is, reciprocity in argriculture rather
than manufacturing); see also CNN.com, French minister: China, India Thwarted WFO
Talks, July 30, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/07/30/wto.france.ap/in-
dex.html.
82. WTO Mini-Ministerial: The Day After, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE, July 30, 2008,
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/07/daily-update-issue-1 l.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Coal. of Serv. Indus., Services Signalling Conference, July 26, 2008, Report by the
Chairman of the TNC, July 30, 2008, JOB (08)/93, http://www.uscsi.org/press/Report%
20by%20the%20chairman%20of%2Othe%20TNC-30%20July%202008%20JOB.pdf.
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alization held on July 26, 2008, in the framework of the July
WTO mini-ministerial conference in Geneva. At this mini-minis-
terial conference, participating countries-mostly developed
and relatively large developing countries-provided indications
of the sort of binding market-opening commitments they would
be willing to undertake under a Doha Round agreement. Such a
signaling conference was just meant to provide a credible signal
that the negotiations were moving forward.
WTO members acknowledged that, while they proceeded
with services liberalization in their economies, the gap between
existing levels of openness and current commitments continued
to widen.85 Some participants stressed that a satisfactory out-
come of the services negotiations could be one of the most sig-
nificant dividends of the DDA, as a Development Round. Most
participants indicated their readiness to improve access condi-
tions for Mode 4.
On Mode 4, Indian commerce minister Kamal Nath was
pleased about the "good movement by the U.S. and by the EU"86
since both WTO Members were prepared to make concessions
on allowing more professionals from India and other developing
countries to work temporarily in their markets.8 7 Mr. Nath was
also pleased about the concessions on Mode 1, since Modes 1
and 4 are important to India's information technology sector.
"He stressed the importance of the domestic regulation aspect of
the services negotiations. An Indian trade official said that the
EC had suggested that it may consider lifting 'economic needs
tests,' a regulatory requirement that can make it nearly impossi-
ble to use Mode 4 access."88
Although the exercise of the July 2008 WTO Mini-Ministe-
rial Conference does not represent the final outcome of the ser-
vices negotiations, it has represented a step forward in the ser-
vices negotiations.
What can the EU do to support the conclusion of the Doha
Round? In the author's opinion, the EU should try to foster a
85. Id.
86. Members Give Mixed Reactions to Lamy Compromise, Take 'A Good Step Fonard' on
Services, BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE, July 27, 2008, http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/07/
daily-update-issue-7-template.pdf [hereinafter Mixed Reactions].
87. See generally Daniel Pruzin, US., EU Cite Moves in "Signaling" Talks On Services;
India Likes "Mode 4" Openings, 25 INr'L TRADE REPORTER 1128 (2008).
88. Mixed Reactions, supra note 86, para. 25.
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new sense of trust with the BRIC countries. However, the prob-
lem seems to be a direct conflict of interests as well as pressure
on the Commission's Directorate-General for external trade not
to be too altruistic. The EU should also refrain from patronizing
as a major economic "old" power. Moreover, the EU should ac-
cept and foster even more actively the new leadership roles of
the BRIC countries.
B. Is Multilateralism the Panacea?
As Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank Group, ar-
gues, the events of September and October 2008 could be a tip-
ping point for many developing countries. As always, the poor
are the most defenseless. Voices around the world are blaming
free markets. Others are asking about the failures of govern-
mental institutions. We cannot turn back the clock on globaliza-
tion. So, we must learn the lessons from the past, as we build for
the future. We must modernize multilateralism and markets for
a changing world economy. The new multilateralism, suiting
our times, will need to be a flexible network, not a fixed one. It
needs to maximize the strengths of interconnecting institutions,
public and private. It should be oriented around pragmatic
problem-solving that fosters a culture of cooperation.s9
In the case of trade, in the absence of a global deal to liber-
alize trade, Robert Zoellick, said that countries should focus on
forging regional agreements "linked to global disciplines,"90 and
that they should try to use trade facilitation measures to decrease
the costs of cross-border commerce.
1. A Note on Plurilateralism
The Doha Round is in crisis.9" If the Doha Round fails or
achieves only very little and very late,92 then the WTO's reputa-
89. Robert Zoellick, President, 'World Bank Group, Modernizing Multilateralism
and Markets, Remarks at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/pa-
per.cfm?ResearchID=1012.
90. Id. sec. 5.
91. For a detailed analysis of the Doha Round, see generally LEAL-ARcAS, EC Ex-
TERNAL TRADE LAw, supra note 57.
92. In the industrial sector in particular, EU trade ministers voiced, in late May
2008, their dissatisfaction with the proposals for a global trade agreement, which they
said did not offer sufficient guarantees on opening up new market opportunities for
their businesses in third countries. Germany in particular slammed new flexibilities in
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tion will be seriously damaged which may translate into an ero-
sion of the WTO's authority and the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding.93 With their large export potential, the BRIC
countries (apart from Russia, which is not yet a WTO member)
should have a very strong interest in the WTO and the function-
ing rules of world trade, which serve as insurance against protec-
tionism and contain the trade powers of the United States and
the EU to quite an important degree.
So how can we prevent the WTO from a deeper crisis? One
possibility is a plurilateral approach to trade agreements,94 which
are optional and not binding to those WTO members who do
not engage in the agreement. The idea behind plurilateral
agreements is to make the WTO deliver again on progressive lib-
eralization. Emerging economies in general, and the BRIC
countries in particular, should take part in it. The EU should try
to create an understanding for this and appeal to the leadership
of the BRIC countries to keep the WTO alive and moving. Once
the texts that would enable large emerging economies such as China to shelter entire
sectors of their industry from outside competition. For BusinessEurope, the latest draft
text "on industrial goods was a 'step backwards for trade liberalisation' due to a new
tariff reduction formula that enables countries like India, Brazil, and Argentina to make
fewer cuts in import duties while allowing new AL'O members such as China and Tai-
wan to phase in tariff cuts over up to 15 years." EurActiv.com, Mandelson Encounters
Resistance in Trade Talks (May 27, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/mandel-
son-encounters-resistance-trade-talks/article-I 72692.
93. The Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") is one of the most important
new features of the WTO. The DSU established a system of review and procedures for
when one of the WTO members complains that the actions or policies of another mem-
ber have harmed it through a violation of WTO rules. Typically, a complaint would be
followed by consultations, possible arbitration, then the formation of a panel of experts,
the panel ruling, possible appeal to the Appellate Body, and, based on the outcome of
the case, either compliance, compensation to the complaining country, or eventual re-
taliation. See RAFAEL LEAL-ARcAs, EC EXTERNAL TRADE LAw, supra note 57, at 418.
94. For the most part, all WTO members subscribe to all WTO Agreements. After
the Uruguay Round, however, there remained four agreements, originally negotiated in
the Tokyo Round, which had a narrower group of signatories and are known as "pluri-
lateral agreements." All other Tokyo Round agreements became multilateral obliga-
tions (i.e., obligations for all WTO members) when the WT'O was established in 1995.
The four were:
" trade in civil aircraft
* government procurement
" dairy products
" bovine meat
The bovine meat and dairy agreements were terminated in 1997. WTO.org, Under-
standing the WrrO: The Agreements, Plurilaterals: Of Minority Interest, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewtoe/whatis.e/tif.e/agrmlOe.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
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again, establishing more trust and a sense of cooperation is im-
portant.
In the plurilateral agreements, members might negotiate on
single topics or across a broad agenda. The risk of this pluri-
lateral approach is to marginalize WTO members, typically the
weakest and poorest members of the WTO family. To avoid this
risk, the world trading system should allow them to participate in
the plurilateral negotiations, but provide them with the freedom
to opt out of a counter-productive result to the negotiations.
The plurilateral process, akin to the bilateral request and
offer mechanism, is informal. It takes place between de-
mandeurs and those from whom they are seeking higher com-
mitments. There are no formal negotiating sessions. There is
no formal chairperson. There are no minutes of these informal
negotiations. And importantly, there is no critical mass of coun-
tries representing 80-90% of world trade in that sector, unless
the negotiations draw in such a large number of countries that
they effectively make up this "critical mass" (an unlikely situation
if it is completely voluntary). That negotiations can take place
through a plurilateral request/offer approach is already out-
lined in Paragraph 11 of the Negotiating Guidelines agreed to by
all WTO members before the GATS negotiations commenced in
2001 .95 At the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, devel-
oped countries9 6 succeeded in getting language permitting
plurilateral negotiations, in addition to the bilateral request/of-
fer negotiating method. This means that a group of countries
will issue one request document demanding broad GATS cover-
age in a particular sector to one country or a group of countries.
Rather than negotiating bilaterally, the countries will negotiate
as a group. Developing nations were successful in preventing a
95. Paragraph 11 reads: "Liberalization shall be advanced through bilateral, pluri-
lateral or multilateral negotiations. The main method of negotiation shall be the re-
quest-offer approach." Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines and Procedures for the
Negotiation on Trade in Services S/L/93 (Mar. 29, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/serve/sl93.doc (last visited May 24, 2008).
96. A developed country is a term used to categorize countries with developed
economies, ones in which the tertiary and quaternary sectors of industry dominate.
This level of economic development usually translates into a high income per capita,
and a high Human Development Index ("HDI"). Countries with high gross domestic
product ("GDP") per capita often fit the previous description of a developed economy;
however, anomalies exist when determining "developed" status by the factor GDP per
capita alone.
372 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:345
text which would have made entering into plurilateral negotia-
tions mandatory, because they were concerned that it would re-
sult in developed countries "ganging up" on individual develop-
ing countries.
As part of the plurilateral negotiating process, the WTO
formed thirteen "Friends Groups" that will develop joint request
documents and a list of countries to which these requests will be
submitted.97 Other Friends Groups may be formed or operate
in a less formal manner. Although the Friends Groups will be
made up of WTO country representatives, major multinational
service businesses have been working closely with each group on
both the content of the offer and on a strategy to break into the
service markets of countries high on their priority lists.
In the case of services trade, to intensify and expedite ser-
vices negotiations, Annex C" of the Draft Hong Kong Ministe-
rial Declaration introduced an interesting mode of negotiations,
i.e., plurilateral negotiations. Annex C also exhorted members
to make new binding market-access commitments across the
four modes of services supply stipulated in the GATS, and to give
up existing restrictions on granting equal treatment to services
providers from all WTO countries. These plurilateral negotia-
tions, unlike conventional bilateral negotiations, "permit a
group of members to present 'collective' requests to other mem-
97. Below is a list of known Friends Groups, and the country chairing their discus-
sions:
1. Audio-visual services (Chinese Taipei)
2. Air Transport (New Zealand)
3. Computer-related services (Chile)
4. Construction services (Japan)
5. Energy services (EU)
6. Environmental services (EU)
7. Express Delivery services (United States)
8. Financial services (Canada)
9. Legal services (Australia)
10. Logistical services (Switzerland)
11. Maritime services (Japan)
12. Mode 3 (Switzerland)
13. Mode 4 (Canada)
14. Telecommunication (Singapore).
Public Citizen, WTO General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS) Glossary, Mar. 23, 2006,
http://www.tradewatch.org/documents/glossaryjinal_03-06.pdf.
98. For a reading of Annex C (annex on services), see Hong Kong WTO Ministe-
rial Conference, Doha Work Programme, Draft Ministerial Declaration Revision, WT/
MIN(05)/W/3/Rev2 (Dec. 18, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/minist-e/min05_e/draft-text5_e.doc.
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bers in any sector or mode of supply."99 Furthermore, "the pluri-
lateral approach has solidified a platform for interested [WTO]
members to build upon initial, sector-specific discussions, either
through an extended round of negotiations similar to what tran-
spired after the Uruguay Round, or in the context of the next
round of services negotiations mandated under the GATS."'O°
That said, Annex C also failed to deliver any timelines for service
negotiations, even in a preliminary sense."' 1
Two weeks of intensive market-access negotiations in ser-
vices trade started at the WTO in mid-April 2007.102 These
marked the first services meetings to be conducted in formal ne-
gotiating mode since the Doha Round talks broke down in July
2006, although there had been informal talks in the interim.
This first week was dedicated to plurilateral meetings between
groups of demandeur countries seeking new market-opening
commitments and the predominantly developing countries to
which they submitted collective requests in February 2006. Al-
though many developing countries remain reluctant to further
open their markets to foreign services providers until there is
more progress in the talks on agriculture and industrial tariffs,
some major demandeur members of the WTO such as the EC
and the United States identified key breakthrough sectors in
which they were especially eager to see new liberalization. These
plurilateral negotiations were more focused than in the past,
benefiting from more thorough preparation by the requesting
WTO members. Each of these sector-specific negotiations was
coordinated by one sponsor of the collective request, and each
had a structured agenda unlike the more free-wheeling discus-
sions in previous plurilateral WTO discussions. The participat-
ing countries were, therefore, "each specifically asked whether
they were going to meet the liberalization commitments set out
99. Cho, supra note 58, at 177-78 (citing TNC: Lamy Outlines Doha Round Roadmap
for Hong Kong and Beyond, 9 BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 19, 2005, at 3
[hereinafter Lamy Outlines Doha Roadmap], available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridges
weekly/6207/).
100. Johannes Bernabe & Shuaihua Cheng, The Doha Round Negotiations on Ser-
vices: An Overview, Paper Prepared for ICTSD Seminar Realizing the Doha Develop-
ment Agenda as if the Future Mattered (Feb. 16-21, 2007).
101. Cho, supra note 58, at 177-78 (citing Lamy Outlines Doha Roadmap, supra note
99).
102. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Resumption of the Doha Round and the Future of Services
Trade, 29 Loy., L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 339, 430 (2007).
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in the collective request, and, if not, why they were unable to do
so.' 10 3 The participating countries were also asked whether they
were prepared formally to bind the level of liberalization actually
applied in practice in each sector and, if they were unable to do
so, why not.1 0 4 The second week was reserved for bilateral nego-
tiations between individual WTO members.
0 5
IV. BILATERALISM/REGIONALISM
What can the EU offer the BRIC countries to foster trust,
sense of cooperation and respectfulness, as well as a better multi-
polar framework of global economic governance? EC trade pol-
icy uses a pyramidal structure with regard to the various degrees
of trade preferences that it offers to different countries and re-
gions. The BRIC countries have by and large been at the bottom
of the preference pyramid thus far. An unofficial ranking of the
preference pyramid would look as follows starting from the top:
new EU Member States and accession candidates, countries with
which the EC has a free-trade agreement, countries of the Medi-
terranean region, the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries,
and the BRIC countries in relation to the Generalized System of
Preferences.' 0 6 So there appears to be a potential to offer more
market access to BRIC countries and embed this in a policy-cen-
tered foreign policy approach.
If we look at bilateral free-trade agreements ("FTAs") as in-
103. Services Cluster Finishes with New Focus on "Breakthrough Sectors," 11 BRIDGES
WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, May 2, 2007, at 5 [hereinafter Services Cluster], available at
http://ictsd.net/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweeklyl 1-15.pdf.
104. In the past, it had proved easier for countries facing requests to take a defen-
sive approach when they wanted to, by asking the different sponsors a series of techni-
cal questions about precisely what they were seeking. See Services: Demandeurs, Requested
Members both Content with Initial Plurilaterals, 10 BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE DIGEST, Apr. 12,
2006, at 1, available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/7391/ (last visited Oct.
26, 2008).
105. See generally Services Cluster, supra note 103.
106. The GSP is a formal system of exemption from the more general rules of the
WTO. Specifically, it is a system of exemption from the MFN principle that obligates
WTO countries to treat the imports of all other WTO countries no worse than they treat
the imports of their most favored trading partner. In essence, MFN requires ITO
countries to treat imports coming from all other WTO countries equally, that is, by
imposing equal tariffs on them, inter alia. For example guides and regulations, see
Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Generalized System of Prefer-
ences Guidebook (Mar. 2008), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeDevelopment/Pref-
erencePrograms/GSP/assetupload file666_8359.pdf; EC External Trade, GSP Fact
Sheet, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradocI39988.pdf.
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struments for liberalizing trade, the "carrot" function is impor-
tant since FTAs offer preferential market-access, whereas, in the
"stick" function, it does not seem to be realistic to withdraw pref-
erences, as the free-trade agreement in question would need to
be breached. This situation seems hardly imaginable and thus
not a credible threat. From the emerging-markets perspective,
another reason for the attractiveness of signing a free-trade
agreement with the EC is their competitive advantage. A free-
trade agreement can level the playing field, for example for Bra-
zil in relation to Mexico and Chile, both of which already have
FTAs with the EC.1 °7 Moreover, there is insurance against trade
defense instruments as these are generally less used against trade
partners. Furthermore, the EU could offer additional incentives
(and therefore show generosity to build more political trust) by
granting larger concessions or demanding fewer concessions
than would be the case in a purely reciprocal give-and-take situa-
tion. However, even if the EU concessions were possible, what
would the EU want to obtain in return? Market access seems to
be the evident answer. This is what trade negotiations are about.
The EC's Directorate-General for trade would come under pres-
sure if EU concessions were not used to enhance market access
for European exporters in growing and important emerging
markets.
However, there are also disadvantages to FTAs, even if FTAs
are WTO-compatible according to GATT Article XXIV. Further
proliferation of FTAs results in transaction costs that serve to the
detriment of multilateral trade liberalization at the WTO level,
thereby provoking a fragmentation of multilateralism. In this
sense, the author would argue that the EU has responsibilities
for the multilateral trading system and therefore should be de-
fensive in bilateralism; in other words, the EU should only react
when other countries make the first move with FTAs to EU ex-
port markets. That was the case with the United States1"8 and
107. See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Communities and Mexico,
EC-Mex., July 1, 2000, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/
ecmexfta.pdf; EC-Chile Intereim Agreement, art. 1, Nov. 18, 2002 WT/REG164, availa-
ble at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/ecchilfta.pdf.
108. See, e.g., US-ASEAN Business Council, Announcement on "Enterprise for
ASEAN Initiative" Marks New Chapter in US-ASEAN Relations, (Oct. 26, 2002).
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Japan °9 after the suspension of the Doha Round in July 2006,
when the European Commission, on behalf of the EC and its
Member States, started negotiating FTAs with India, ASEAN, and
South Korea.1 ° The aim was to not lose the opportunities of-
fered by the new emerging markets in Asia.
Since July 2006 (the date of the Doha Round of multilateral
trade talks suspension), we have seen the obvious weaknesses
and deficiencies of the multilateral trading system and, as a reac-
tion, the proliferation of regionalism-although this has been
happening for quite some time now"'-and bilateralism. What
does this mean for the future of global economic governance?
After the suspension of the WTO Doha negotiations, the
109. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan's FTA Strategy (Summary)
(2002), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/strategyO210.h tml.
110. See Marc Maes, The EU Approach to FTA Talks with ASEAN, India, Korea,
SUNS No. 6171 (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo
490c.htm.
111. See generally Ali M. El-Agraa, A. Regional Trade Arrangements Worldwide, in Eco-
NOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (Ali M. El-Agraa ed., 1997) (discussing major regional
trade agreements worldwide on a comprehensive yet basic level); Victor Bulmer-
Thomas, Regional Integration in Latin America Before the Debt Crisis: LAFFA, CACM and the
Andean Pact, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (disussing the evolution of regional
trade agreements in Latin America from the 1920s through the mid-1980s); Victor
Bulmer-Thomas, Regional Integration in Latin America since 1985: Open Regionalism and
Globalisation, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (discussing the sea change in trade
policies, export-led growth and international cooperation that occurred in Latin
America after 1985); Victoria Curzon Price, The European Free Trade Association, in ECO-
NOMIC INTEGRATION (examining the three phases of European integration beginning in
1960); Ali M. El-Agraa & Shelton M.A. Nicholls, The Caribbean Community and Common
Market, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (examining economic integration in the
Caribbean and its failure to generate growth and success in generating functional coop-
eration agreements); Ali M. E1-Agraa, Integration Amongst Members of the Arab League, in
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (analyzing how the three main integrations agree-
ments in the Arab world are good attempts at integration but fall short of creating a
viable long-term economic unit); Richard Pomfret, The Association of South-East Asian
Nations, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (discussing the longevity of ASEAN and
its limited economic achievements); Peter Robson, Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, in
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (discussing the development of regional economic
agreements in Africa); Sidney Weintraub, The North American Free Trade Agreement, in
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (analyzing the content of NAFTA, the motivations
behind its creations, and its effects regionally and globally); see also REGIONAL TRADE
BLOCS, MULTILATERALISM, AND THE GATT: COMPLEMENTARY PATHS TO FREE TRADE? (Till
Geiger & Dennis Kennedy eds., 1996) (providing a political economy and policy-ana-
lyst's perspective about how regional and multilateral trade agreements coexist) [here-
inafter REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS]; REGIONALISM IN WORLD POLITICS: REGIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER, (Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell eds., Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1995) (examining the politics and political economy of contemporary
regionalism).
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European Commission looked ready to refocus its commercial
strategy on bilateral free-trade agreements so as to catch up with
the United States and Japan. ' 12 Bilateralism/regionalism is the
normal consequence of failed multilateralism. ' 13 This certainly
has dangerous repercussions on weak economies.114 Concluding
the Doha Round officially remains the EC's number one prior-
ity. But, since negotiations were suspended in July 2006"' -
when last resort talks failed to bring an agreement on reducing
farm subsidies and lowering tariffs, leading the WTO chief Pas-
cal Lamy to formally suspend the Doha Round-the EC has been
looking for other ways to open up foreign markets" 6 and keep
up with its main trade rival, the United States, which is cur-
rently leading the race to conclude FTAs with high-market-po-
tential countries.
1 1 7
The European Commission's decision ' 8 to launch new bi-
lateral trade negotiations" 9 with countries such as India, South
112. See Commission Memorandum Research Shows Big Potential Gains from New EU
FTAs (April 23, 2007), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2O07/apriI/tradoc_
134543.pdf.
113. See generally GUIDO GLANIA & JURGEN MATTHES, MULTILATERALISM OR REGION-
ALIsM? TRADE POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005) (discussing bilateral-
ism versus multilateralism and the EU by examining the development of regional trade
agreements, assessing the advantages and disadvantages, and evaluating other options).
114. Leon Trakman, however, claims that bilateralism can actually help develop-
ing countries in the world trading system. See Leon Trakman, The Proliferation of Free
Trade Agreements: Bane or Beauty? 5-8 (Univ. of New South Wales Faculty of L. Research
Series Paper No. 54, 2007).
115. After five years of troubled negotiations, the Doha Development Round,
aimed at freeing global trade and at extending the benefits of globalization to develop-
ing countries, was suspended following the failure of negotiators to reach a compro-
mise about reducing farming subsidies and lowering import tariffs. The resumption of
the Doha talks took place in February 2007. See LEAL-ARcAS, EC EXTERNAL TRADE LAw,
supra note 57, at 564.
116. This has been the case with emerging markets. See Commission Communica-
tion, Global Europe: Competing in the World, COM (2006) 567 Final § 3.2 (Oct. 4,
2006) (to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions).
117. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that this proliferation of bilateral trade
agreements outside the WTO process is perceived as betraying the multilateral ideals
that underlay the WTO and its forerunner, the General Agreement on Tarrifs and
Trade ("GATT"). See Stephen Woolcock, Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading
System, in REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS, supra note 111, at 119.
118. See Commission Press Release, IP/07/540 (Apr. 23 2007).
119. See Council Press Release (Apr. 23, 2007) (Conclusions on the Recommendations
to open Negotiations with Countries of ASEAN, India and South Korea, 2795th General Affairs
Council Meeting), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/
docs/pressData/en/gena/93765.pdf.
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Korea, and the ten ASEAN 1 2 1 states121 "could further complicate
its trade regime, and divert interest from the multilateral trading
system, '' 122 according to a bi-annual report carried out by the
WTO on the EC's trade policies and practices. On the specific
case of ASEAN, European and Southeast Asian leaders agreed to
step up efforts towards concluding a deal establishing what
would be one of the largest free-trade zones in the world, at a
bilateral summit in Singapore in November 2007. However,
"talks were overshadowed by disagreements about how to deal
with the military dictatorship in Myanmar following its bloody
crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in September
[2007] . ' 12' The Commission also hopes to negotiate more far-
reaching agreements than would be possible under the WTO
talks, by tackling issues such as investment, competition policy,
and public procurement-known as the Singapore issues-
which were dropped from the Doha agenda in 2003.124 This
return to a system of bilateral agreements and FTAs will mean
that the large WTO members would be able to strong-arm the
small members and that the multiplication of, trade rules and
tariffs would generate higher transaction costs and damage the
trading and investment environment.
However, in a speech to the European Parliament's Interna-
tional Trade Committee on October 17, 2006, Pascal Lamy
warned that bilateral deals could contribute to weakening the
multilateral trading system. 125 Moreover, he argued that the
120. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Ministerial Statement of the
ASEAN Economic Ministers and the European Union Trade Commissioner on the
Launch of Negotiations for the ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (May 4,
2007), http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-EU-FTA.pdf; see also EurActiv.com, EU
launches Free-Trade Talks with ASEAN (May 4, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/en/
trade/eu-launches-free-trade-talks-asean/article-163559.
121. EurActiv.com, EU to Start Free Trade Talks with India, South Korea and
ASEAN (Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-start-free-trade-talks-in-
dia-south-korea-asean/article-163321.
122. Sectretariat Report, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, Summary
Observations, 20, WT7/TPR/S/177 (Jan. 22, 2007).
123. EurActiv.com, EU, ASEAN to Push for Trade Deal Despite Myanmar Discord
(Nov. 23, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-asean-push-trade-deal-despite-
myanmar-discord/article-168629.
124. See generally PeterJ. Lloyd & Donald MacLaren, The EU's New Trade Strategy and
Regionalisation in the World Economy, 61 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 423 (2006).
125. See Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, Address to the European Par-
liament's Committee on International Trade (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.
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growing number of bilateral and regional trade talks' 2' risked
distracting from attempts to clinch a long-elusive global deal.
127
Lamy noted that when it came to bilateral talks, some countries
appeared to be promising concessions beyond what would be
needed to unblock the multilateral negotiations. Before the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, he said:
While bilateral agreements can be a useful complement, I do
not believe they can substitute a strong multilateral trading
system. Bilateral agreements are by their very nature discrimi-
natory. They have obvious limitations in terms of issues cov-
ered since they do not tackle the toughest areas where trade
restrictive and distorting measures, such as subsidies, still pre-
vail. They may lead to trade diversion as opposed to trade
creation. And they complicate the trading environment of
economic operators who have to abide by a spaghetti bowl of
different rules. In short, bilateral agreements are not the easy
way out.'2 8
Patrick Messerlin argues along the same lines by saying that
multilateral liberalization of trade should be the center of Euro-
pean trade strategy, and claims that the recent shift in EC trade
policy to negotiate bilateral agreements is taking the EC into
dangerous waters on the grounds "that the bilateral trade agree-
ments considered by the EC are generally characterised by high
tariff and non-tariff barriers in goods, and by restrictive regula-
tions in services and investment."' 29  Stephen Woolcock, how-
ever, argues that the EC's increased use of FTAs is compatible
with its commitment to multilateralism, but only if the bloc rede-
wto.org/english/news e/sppl-e/spp44_e.htm (warning that the Doha failure will seri-
ously weaken the trading system).
126. For an analysis of the main trends and characteristics of regional trade agree-
ments, in force and under negotiation, see Roberto V. Fiorentino, Luis Verdeja & Chris-
telle Toqueboeuf, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006 Update,
WTO Discussion Paper No 12, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res
_e/bookspe/discussion-papers8_e.pdf.
127. The same argument is made by a WTO report, which claims that the EC's
decision to seek bilateral free-trade agreements, as well as its rising agricultural tariffs,
could be detrimental to the Doha negotiations on a global-trade pact. See Report by the
European Communities, Trade Policy Review, 2, Wr/TPR/G/177, at 2, 10 (Jan. 22
2007), available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratope/tpre/g177_e.doc.
128. Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, U.S. Leadership Will Be Key to the
Fate of the Round, Address to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (April 23, 2007), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/sppl61_e.htm.
129. EurActiv.com, Assessing EU Trade Policy in Goods (July 31, 2007), http://
www.euractiv.com/en/trade/assessing-eu-trade-policy-goods/article-164278.
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fines its concept of "all trade" as being ninety-five percent of
trade and avoids excluding large bands of sensitive products in
specific sectors such as agriculture. 131 While the EC will find
that it might be able to address some of its specific concerns
through bilateral agreements, it is the author's belief that it will
not be able to answer all of them. In addition, the countries that
the EC will negotiate with in these bilateral negotiations will
want to see some concerns, like subsidies in agriculture, ad-
dressed somehow and that will only be through the multilateral,
that is, the WTO, process.
In the face of globalization, the EC must remain open. It
must also ensure that markets abroad are open to its own ex-
ports. European businesses often find it difficult to access for-
eign markets due to high tariff and non-tariff barriers,' as well
as discriminatory measures applied against foreign companies.
Removing such barriers is particularly important in the services
sector, which represents around seventy percent of Europe's jobs
and of the EU's gross domestic product ("GDP"), 3 2 but which
faces higher trade barriers than goods, mostly due to restrictive
national regulations, such as technical standards, licensing re-
quirements or national discrimination. 33
This proposal of bilateral trade agreements as a result of the
suspension of the Doha talks is diametrically opposite to the
EC's previous trade strategy, in which the focus was strongly on
multilateral negotiations within the WTO, and free trade deals
were primarily driven by the logic of development or geopolitics
rather than economic interests. That said, U.S. businesses in Eu-
rope urged EU and U.S. leaders to stop neglecting the transat-
lantic relationship in favor of boosting relations with China and
130. Stephen Woolcock, European Union Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements 11
(ECIPE Working Paper No. 03/2007), available at http://www.ecipe.org/publications/
ecipe-working-papers/european-union-policy-towards-free-trade-agreements/PDF.
131. International Financial Services London acknowledges its concerns about va-
rious barriers to doing business in India. See International Financial Services London,
EU-India Talks, IFSL to Consult on City Views (Mar. 5, 2008), http://ww.ifsl.org.uk/out-
put/Reporttem.aspx?NewsID=100 (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
132. Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency, EU Accession: Doing Business in an
Expanding Europe, Newsletter No. 18, at 2 (2004), available at http://www.nfia-hong
kong.com/en-US/newsletter/e-news 18_2.htm. A region's GDP is one of several mea-
sures of the size of its economy. The GDP of a country is defined as the market value of
all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time.
133. See ROBERT M. MAcLEAN, EU TRADE BARRIER REGULATION: TACKLING UNFAIR
FOREIGN TRADE PRAcricEs 43 (2d ed. 2006) (2000).
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India.134 They argued "that the two transatlantic economies
have become so highly interdependent that their future growth
and job creation relies not on improving their relations with
China and India, nor in completing a successful Doha Round,
but in removing existing barriers to trade and investment in or-
der to create a veritable 'transatlantic single market.'
1 3 5
As WTO membership has grown, interests have diversified,
and negotiations have become more cumbersome, countries
have resorted to establishing regional trade agreements
("RTAs"). 36 RTAs focus on the interests of countries in a partic-
ular region or group of regions, and not on global interests.
137
By 2010, the WTO estimates that nearly 400 RTAs will be in ef-
fect.138 RTAs allow for more efficient trade negotiations and
permit countries greater freedom to choose their trading part-
ners, trade deals and conditions of trade. However, since RTAs
operate outside the multilateral WTO system, many questions as
to how the transition from a multilateral to a regional trading
system will shape the way we think about social, political, and
environmental issues arise. 39 For example, how will trade rela-
tions between developed and developing nations change? Will
RTAs become a tool for implementing the policy agenda of the
powerful? What social, environmental, and political issues will
arise under RTAs? Will RTAs hamper attempts to develop global
134. EurActiv.com, US Businesses Call for "Transatlantic Single Market" (Apr. 8,
2007), http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/us-businesses-call-transatlantic-single-mar-
ket/article-159894.
135. Id.
136. See Thomas Cottier, The Challenge of Regionalization and Preferential Relations in
World Trade Law and Policy, 2 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 149, 152-53 (1996); Thomas Cot-
tier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The Relationship Between World Trade Organization
Law, National and Regional Law, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 83 (1998); Gabrielle Marceau &
Cornelium Reiman, When and How Is a Regional Trade Agreement Compatible with the
WTO?, 28 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 297-336 (2001); Sung-Hoon Park, Regional-
ism, Open Regionalism and Article XX1V GATT: Conflicts and Harmony, in REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, at 267 n.12 (F. Snyder ed., 2002);Joost
Pauwelyn, The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L.
109 (2004); Heinz G. Preusse, Regional Integration in the Nineties: Stimulation or Threat to
the Multinational Trading System?, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 151 (1994); Joel P.
Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition? Standardization and Regional Integration under Arti-
cle XXIV of GATT, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 460 (2003).
137. Marceau & Reiman, supra note 136, at 299.
138. World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/region-e/region-e.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
139. Marceau & Reiman, supra note 136, at 301.
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standards on labor rights, women's rights, environmental protec-
tion, and other social issues?
The next Section will present a country-by-country examina-
tion of bilateral trade relations between the EU and the BRIC
countries.
V. TRADE ANALYSIS OF THE EU VIS-A-VIS THE
BRIC COUNTRIES
Before starting with a trade analysis of the EU vis-A-vis the
BRIC countries, it is important to note the differences among
these countries. The BRIC countries may be classified in two
groups. A first group composed of Brazil and India, which are
not yet global economic superpowers, they are only starting to
grow into a more powerful role. Therefore, the EU can try to
foster this development in a cooperative stance and establish
trust with Brazil and India. A second group, composed of China
and Russia, which in some areas are more assertive than the first
group. It is in this group where we find major problems with the
EU. In this sense, the EU could be in a strong position, but is not
because of the EU dependence on Russian energy supply, and
because of the large Chinese market and the fact that China is a
growing economic and political power.
A. Brazil
The EU is Brazil's main trading partner, while Brazil repre-
sents the EU's main trading partner in Latin America.14 Brazil
is an efficient agricultural producer with strong interest in EU
agricultural liberalization. Furthermore, Brazil constitutes 1.5%
of EU services trade with the world, with EU exports of services
to Brazil totaling EUR 4.4 billion and EU imports of services
from Brazil in 2005 totaling EUR 3.9 billion.' 4 ' The 1992 EC-
Brazil Cooperation Agreement 142 provides the institutional set-
ting for the political ties between the EU and Brazil and a frame-
work for cooperation in trade in services, among other fields.
Since the establishment of the 1995 inter-regional Cooperation
140. EurActiv.com, EU, Brazil Join in Strategic Partnership (July 5, 2007), http://
www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-braziljoin-strategic-partnership/article-165263.
141. European Commission, Brazil Trade Statistics 1 (2008), http://trade.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc 113359.pdf (citing to Eurostat).
142. Council Decision No. 95/445/EC, O.J. L 262, 54-65 (1995).
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Agreement' 4 3 between the EC and its Member States, on the Eu-
ropean side, and Mercado Comfin del Sur ("Mercosur"), 1  on
the South American side, EU-Brazilian negotiations have mainly
been carried out through this framework.145
Since 2000, the EU and Mercosur have been in the process
of negotiating a bi-regional Association Agreement, '46 including
a free trade area. This will be the backbone of future bilateral
trade relations. Substantial progress in the trade chapter of the
agreement allowed both parties to realistically envisage a conclu-
sion of negotiations by the end of October 2004. However, on
October 20, 2004, "at the occasion of a Mercosur-EU trade nego-
tiators meeting at ministerial level in Lisbon, (Trade] Ministers
concurred that the offers on the table did not reach the degree
of ambition that both parties expect from this agreement and
decided to give negotiations more time. ' 147 Following a number
of technical contacts in 2005 to discuss the ways to re-engage the
process, trade ministers met again on September 2, 2005, to dis-
cuss a way forward. 48
In 2005, Brazil represented eighty percent of Mercosur's
GDP and is critical to Mercosur's further integration. In my
143. Council Decision No. 96/205/EC, O.J. L 69, 4 (1996).
144. MERCOSUR stands for Mercado Comfin del Sur (Common Market of the
Southern Cone) and is composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. It was
founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunci6n, which was later amended and updated by
the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto (December 17, 1994). Its purpose is to promote free
trade and the fluid movement of goods, peoples, and currency. Edgardo Rotman, A
Guide to MERCOSUR Legal Research: Sources and Documents, 1-2 (2005), http://www.nyu
lawglobal.org/Globalex/Mercosur.htm. On December 9, 2005, Venezuela was ac-
cepted as a new member, but not scheduled to be officialized until later. Simone
Baribeau, Venezuela to Enter MERCOSUR as Full Member, Venezuelanalysis.com, Dec. 9,
2005, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/1521.
145. See Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations
and European Neighbourhood Policy, Address to the Instituto Roberto Simonsen and
the Federation of the Industries of the State of Sao Paulo: Steering the EU/Brazil-
Mercosul Relationship for the Challenges Ahead (July 12, 2005).
146. For an overview of association agreements concluded by the European Com-
munities with third parties, see LEAL-ARcAS, EC EXTERNAL TRADE LAW, supra note 57, at
282-88.
147. European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations: MERCOSUR (Sept. 2007),
http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:awNxeHOML4wJ:ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bi-
lateral/regions/mercosur/index_en.htm+Trade+relations+between+the+EU+andthe+
Mercosur.
148. Id.
149. See Towards EU-Brazil Partnership, supra note 63, at 9 (citing the World
Bank).
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opinion, in addition to the EU agricultural liberalization issue
mentioned earlier, this intra-Mercosur disparity is one of the rea-
sons why the EU-Mercosur negotiations for the conclusion of a
bi-regional Association Agreement, including a free-trade area,
which began in April 2000, do not seem to come to an end: on
the South American end, there is a tremendous imbalance of
power within Mercosur; Brazil is an enormous market of 190 mil-
lion people, whereas Uruguay is of insignificant interest to Bra-
zil, with a total population of 3.5 million people. 15' This asym-
metry makes Mercosur's search for a common position vis-d-vis
the EU very difficult.
In July 2007, the EU-Brazil Summit, in the framework of a
Strategic Partnership, 151 reaffirmed both parties' commitment to
resolving the EU-Mercosur negotiations between the two blocs
(which "have been effectively stalled for more than two
1535ayears"), the Doha Round of trade negotiations,"' as well as
initiating a dialogue on the EU and Brazilian shipping market
developments. 154  Despite liberalization processes throughout
the 1990's, Brazilian goods and services markets still enjoy a rela-
tively high level of protection through various barriers to trade
of both a tariff and a non-tariff barrier nature, especially in trans-
port and ports. 155  Furthermore, despite the approval of the
Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services of Mercosur 56 by the
Mercosur Council 157 in 1997, Brazil has yet to ratify the Protocol.
150. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uruguay, https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2008).
151. See Towards EU-Brazil Partnership, supra note 63, at 20; see also Commission
Press Release, IP/07/725 (May 30, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressRe-
leasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/725&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui-
Language=en.
152. First EU-Brazil Business Summit, Joint Declaration of Brazilian and European
Business 3 (July 4 2007), available at http://www.summits.aip.pt/brasil/docs/oint-
statementEN.pdf.
153. Id. at 2.
154. Id.
155. See generally European Commission, Brazil, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/is-
sues/bilateral/countries/brazil/indexen.htm (last visited May 19, 2008).
156. See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Recent Developments Affecting the MERCOSUR Eco-
nomic Integration Project, 42 THUNDERBIRD INT'L Bus. REv. 1 (2002), available at http://
www.mercosurconsulting.net/Articles/article6.html.
157. The [Mercosur] Council consists of the Foreign Relations and Economics
Ministers of the four (Mercosur's] member states. Its presidency rotates
among the member states, in alphabetical order, every six months. The Coun-
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Brazil has not participated in any other preferential treatment
agreements in services to date. Moreover, Brazil's specific com-
mitments under the GATS cover the following areas: communi-
cation services, business services, construction services, financial
services, distribution services, tourism, and transport services.
Although it participated in the WTO negotiations on financial
services and in the negotiations on basic telecommunications, as
of June 2003 Brazil had ratified 58 neither the Fourth Protocol
on Basic Telecommunications 5 9 nor the Fifth Protocol on Fi-
nancial Services. 6 ° These numbers show the importance of agri-
culture for Brazil.
So what is Brazil's interest in EC trade policy? Brazil's main
interest is the EU's agricultural liberalization, given that Brazil is
considered a highly efficient agricultural producer that is ex-
pected to gain tremendously from the EU's liberalization. If this
will be the case after the conclusion of the Doha Round, it will
certainly be so even more from a potential free-trade agreement
between the EC and Brazil. Moreover, Brazilian exports of agri-
cultural products (such as coffee, cocoa, and sugar) to the EU
account for forty-one percent of Brazilian exports,'61 and ten
percent of EU imports.
What can the EU offer Brazil? The EU could grant tariff
preferences in agriculture and other goods where Brazil is com-
petitive, such as biofuels and ethanol as environmental goods.
cil is responsible for the political leadership of the integration process [among
Mercosur's Member States] and for taking decisions to ensure the implemen-
tation of [Mercosur's] objectives. . .. In addition, the Council is the legal
representative of Mercosur, entitled to sign agreements with third part[ies].
RAFAEL A. PORRATA-DORIA, JR., MERCOSUR: THE COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTHERN
CONE 27-28 (2005).
158. The reason for non-ratification of the Fourth Protocol on Basic Telecommu-
nications was due to incompatibilities between Brazil's specific commitments and the
Brazilian legal and regulatory framework in place since July 1997. See Secretariat Re-
port, Trade Policy Review-Brazil, WT/TPR/S/140, 161 (Nov. 1, 2004), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/GENviewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/
DDFDocumerits/t/WT/TPR/S140-4.doc.
159. Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 30,
1996, WTO/S/L/20.
160. Fifth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 3, 1997,
WTO/S/L/45.
161. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Brazil
Would Gain from Freer Agricultural Trade but Small Farms Need to Adjust, Oct. 31, 2005,
http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,3343,es_2649_34487_35584190_1_1_1,00.
html.
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"Brazil is by far the world's most important producer of fuels
made from plants . . .and [it] has the greatest potential world-
wide for affordable biofuels.... The country's traditional sugar
cane cultures provide biomass for the production of ethanol,
and soy beans are used to make fuel oils. ' 16 2 However, granting
tariff preferences in agriculture to Brazil may present difficulties.
The main reasons for these difficulties are: 1) The Doha Round
of multilateral trade negotiations should have priority over re-
gionalism or bilateralism; 2) It is only reasonable to liberalize
agricultural subsidies multilaterally in the context of the Doha
Round; hence the strong Brazilian interest in a successful Doha
Round; and 3) Agricultural tariff preferences to Brazil would
harm the interest of the poorer developing countries. Moreo-
ver, a tension between the EU and Brazil exists over biofuels.
Europeans are under pressure to develop stronger sustainability
criteria for biofuels imports, and may drop the current target of
having biofuels account for at least ten percent of vehicle fuel by
2020.163 For its part, "Brazil has ... warned of a potential WTO
dispute if EU environmental norms turn out to harm Brazil's
ethanol exports." '16 4
B. India
According to a communication of the European Commis-
sion, "the focus of [EU-India] relations has shifted from trade to
wider political issues." 165 However, trade continues to play a ma-
jor role between the two parties. EU trade with India has more
than doubled since 2000. The EU and India hope to increase
their trade in both goods and services through negotiations for a
free trade agreement. The current negotiations over an EC-In-
dia FTA, whose parameters were set out in the report of the EU-
162. EurActiv.com, EU, Brazil Join in Strategic Partnership (July 5, 2007), http://
www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-braziljoin-strategic-partnership/article-165263.
163. See EurActiv.com, Calls Grow for EU to "Suspend" Biofuels Push (Apr. 14,
2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/calls-grow-eu-suspend-biofuels-push/ar-
ticle-171610.
164. Problems Loom in EU-LatAm Relations, BRIDGES (ICTSD), May 2008, at 19, avail-
able at http://ictsd.net/downloads/bridges/bridgesl2-3.pdf.
165. Commission Communication COM (2004) 430 Final, 3 (2004) (to the Coun-
cil, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: An
EU-India Strategic Partnership) [hereinafter EU-India Strategic Partnership].
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India High Level Trade Group,' 66 commenced in June 2007,167
and parallel negotiations include a maritime agreement, since
maritime transport accounts for fifty-three percent of the total
transportation transactions, being unequivocally the major
mode of transportation.' 68 The main framework for trade dia-
logue between the EU and India is, nevertheless, the WTO.
There is an India-EU Strategic Partnership'69 as well as its Joint
Action Plan170 that outline commitments to reciprocally tackle
existing barriers to trade and increase bilateral trade flows.
The EC-India FIA has been progressing increasingly slowly
for some months, but continues to represent a major opportu-
nity for European firms.1 7 ' There are still some key barriers to
doing business in India and national treatment concerns, which
European companies wish to overcome. 7 2 In fact, in 2008 the
World Bank ranked India 114 (out of 181 economies) in terms
of the "ease of doing business."'1 73 This is the case of telecoms
and courier services, the latter being a service where India has
not yet made any offers or commitments within the GATS. Sev-
eral sectors, including maritime transportation, construction,
and telecommunications, require the approval of the Foreign In-
vestment Promotion Board 7 4 prior to establishment. In distri-
166. See generally European Commission, Report of the EU-India High Level Trade
Group to the EU-India Summit, Oct. 13, 2006.
167. For further information on this, see generally Jim Rollo, Spice Route to Europe?
Prospects for an India-EU Free Trade Area, CHATHAM HOUSE, IEP/JEF BP 07/02, October
2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/551 /.
168. See generally Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?-pageid
=1090,30070682,1090_33076576&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Nov. 12,
2008).
169. See generally EU-India Strategic Partnership, supra note 165.
170. See EU Council, The India-EU Strategic Partnership: Joint Action Plan, Sept. 7,
2005, C/05/223, available at europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
PRES/05/223&format=PDF&aged=l &language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
171. See Ecorys Research & Consulting, Cuts Int'l, & Centad, Global Analysis Report
for the EU-India TSIA, Draft Version, TRADE07/CI/CO1-Lot I (May 21, 2008).
172. See International Financial Services London, EU-India Talks, IFSL to Consult on
City Views, http://www.ifsl.org.uk/tradepolicy/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
173. See The World Bank Group, Doing Business in India, http://www.doingbusi-
ness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=89 (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
174. The Foreign Investment Promotion Board is the:
only [governmental Indian] agency dealing with matters relating to [foreign
direct investment] FDI as well as promoting investment into the country....
Its objective is to promote FDI into India undertaking investment promotion
activities in India and abroad by facilitating investment in the country through
international companies, non-resident Indians, and other foreign investors.
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bution services, where the EU has taken a leading role in advo-
cating the liberalization of market access, there currently exist
no retail commitments, and in some sectors including express
delivery, draft legislation currently threatens existing market ac-
cess.
Mode 3 of the GATS (commercial presence) has been most
liberalized in India. The Indian Ministry of Commerce increased
foreign equity limits to seventy-four percent in all telecom sub-
sectors between 2000 and 2006, and to one hundred percent in
internet service provision lacking a gateway. This foreign invest-
ment comes with a number of non-quantitative restrictions relat-
ing to national treatment. Strict guidelines exist on the permit-
ted composition of an Indian company's board, with a majority
required to have Indian citizenship.
Moreover, in addition to tariff barriers to imports, India also
imposes a number of non-tariff barriers in the form of quantita-
tive restrictions, import licensing, mandatory testing and certifi-
cation for a large number of products, as well as complicated
and lengthy customs procedures. There is a high variety in treat-
ment in the various sectors and among Indian states, which cre-
ates confusion and additional costs for foreign companies seek-
ing to establish in India. 17 5 The postal and courier services have
in recent years undergone a period of worldwide liberalization.
The EU has advocated further liberalization and an increase in
the scope of coverage pertaining to the GATS commitments. 176
In this sense, the EU has been working consistently to eliminate
monopolies in the postal and courier services sector. 177
As for the specific case of telecommunications, European
service providers looking for growth opportunities are eager to
supply to large markets in emerging economies such as India.
The current area of coverage in many emerging countries re-
mains low to date. If emerging economies were to further liber-
India Finance & Investment Guide, available at http://finance.indiamart.com/invest-
ment inindia/fipb.html.
175. Controller of Communication Accounts Haryana, Recommendation on Growth of
Telecom Services in Rural India, 48-49 (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://ccaharyana.gov.
in/recom3octO5.pdf.
176. See European Commission, Summary of the EC's Revised Requests to Third Coun-
tries in the Services Negotiations under the DDA 5 (Jan. 24, 2005).
177. European Commission, The Doha Development Agenda: Summary of the
EU's Revised Services Offer in the Doha Negotiations, June 2, 2005, http://ec.europa.
eu/trade/issues/newround/doha-da/memo020605_en.htm.
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alize their telecommunications markets, European providers
would benefit from large gains. Accordingly, the EC requests
that all countries, except for least-developed countries, allow full
competition in their telecom markets. At the moment, the com-
petition difficulties include the granting of exclusive rights to
suppliers and mandatory economic needs tests for new entrants.
In addition, there are oftentimes severe limitations on foreign
equity and regulations that render some foreign operators una-
ble to gain establishment by disallowing majority control of their
businesses and restricting the types of legal entity permitted.
The difficulty in decreasing legislation on these limitations to
the national treatment principle has been compounded by the
fact that many countries lack an independent telecom regulator.
Since 2002, the telecom industry in India has grown rapidly,
with subscribers to wired and wireless service increasing from
44.97 million in March 2002 to 225 million in June 2006, an av-
erage annual growth rate of 49.5%. i t s Within this growth, mo-
bile telephony dominates, reaching 185 million subscribers in
June 2007, from 13 million in 2003, an average annual growth
rate of 94%.179 During the same period, private participation
increased significantly, from a 15.1% market share in March
2002 to 64.1% in November 2006, eroding the share of India's
two public sector providers, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited.18 0
Between August 1991 and July 2007, India's telecom sector
collected approximately US$20 billion in foreign direct invest-
ment ("FDI"), accounting for nearly ten percent of all foreign
direct investment."' FDI has been particularly high in recent
years, in the aftermath of increasingly progressive liberalization,
with US$2.3 billion to the telecom sector in the 2006-07 fiscal
year and US$3.4 billion in the first four months of 2007-08
alone. Is2 The growth of India's telecommunications sector has
been driven by necessity as well as a trend of autonomous liberal-
178. Planning Commission, Gov't India, Eleventh Five Year Plan, 2007-2012, 425,
available at http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/I1th/I Iv3/ 1 Iv3
chl2.pdf.
179. Id.
180. See generally WTO Secretariat, India Trade Policy Review, WT/TPR/S/182
(Apr. 18, 2007).
181. See generally UNCTAD, World Investment Reports (1991-2008), http://Vw.
unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD= 1485.
182. Indian Ministry of Commerce, Department of Industrial Policy and Promo-
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ization since 1991. Telephone density has primarily grown in
cities, with 2006 urban rates at 51.5% and rural areas at 1.85%.
The Indian government's original plans were to increase rural
connections to 50 million by the end of 2007 and to 80 million
by 2010 to remedy this development gap, using subsidies that
primarily aid the mobile telephony infrastructure.18 3
In the WTO framework, under the current Doha Round of
trade negotiations, additional commitments have been offered
by India, with the most recent revision in 2005 including broad
liberalization of the telecoms sector, with a 49% foreign equity
cap in all subsectors besides data and message transmission ser-
vices (i.e., electronic mail, voice mail, et cetera), where 74% for-
eign investment was allowed." 4 During the approval process,
overseen by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board, prefer-
ence is given to foreign operators willing to transfer technology
to Indian joint partners, and upon gaining market access, no
subsidies which domestic companies enjoy are afforded to for-
eign operators." 5 The lack of national treatment in this regard
is notable, given the universal service obligation's'86 ambitions to
remedy low rural teledensity rates through the use of subsidies.
Telecommunications services are not only important eco-
nomic drivers, but they are also indispensable for trade and de-
velopment. A liberalization of the telecommunications services
sector assists communication infrastructures for businesses and
individuals and reduces costs for industry and private users. The
case of Morocco demonstrates how liberal domestic policy mea-
sures can deliver impressive results. In June 1997, Morocco im-
tion, Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment,July 2007, available at http://www.dipp.nic.in/
fdistatistics/indiafdi july_2007.pdf.
183. See S.K. Hajela, India-ICT Development Scenario, Experts' Group Meeting of
the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific/Informa-
tion, Communication, and Space Technology Division, Bangkok, 30 November-i De-
cember 2006, http://www.unescap.org/icstd/events/EGMNovDec2006/India.ppt.
184. See generally India Pakistan Trade Unit, Investing in India (2002), http://www.
iptu.co.uk/content/indiainvestment.asp.
185. Business.Gov.In, Joint Ventures, http://business.gov.in/growingbusiness/
jointventures.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
186. Universal service obligation provides the basis for the public to have access to
an affordable basic voice telephony service, as defined by the governing body, and capa-
ble of being applied consistently across all Member States. The level of basic service
and its evolving definition is reviewed periodically. See Birds-Eye.Net, http://www.birds-
eye.net/definition/acronym.cgi?what+is+USO=Universal+Service+Obligation&id=1 153
058029 (last visited May 20, 2008).
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plemented a broad reform program through its telecom sector
law. This law laid the foundations for private participation and
competition. This broad-reaching law established the indepen-
dent regulator and provided for the privatization of the incum-
bent operator.18 1 In 1999, a second license was awarded to a
consortium led by Telef6nica and Portugal Telecom for license
fees amounting to US$1.1 billion."' This figure alone was equal
to approximately two years of Morocco's capital inflows.'8 9 In
addition, the competition induced the incumbent to lower tar-
iffs to almost 50% of its former level within one year and to
double its number of subscribers within two years. 190 Within two
years of issuing the license, Morocco had increased its mobile
penetration to 5 million. 91 In December 2000, 35% of Maroc
Telecom was sold to Vivendi Universal for 23.3 billion Dirhams,
a figure which significantly exceeded those from comparator
countries. 192
As for construction services, as they become more global-
ized, there is a need for large civil engineering companies to
export high-quality design as well as engineering and manage-
ment services. European construction companies are well suited
to the globalization trend. The construction activities of most
emerging countries are high-volume low-margin, and European
companies are in a strong position to take advantage of the in-
creasing need for infrastructure in emerging economies. The
main issues to resolve in construction services are lack of open-
ness, lack of market transparency, market access barriers, and
national treatment concerns. For example, many countries ap-
ply high foreign equity requirements to underwrite the risk of
187. See Mohammed lbahrine, Towards a National Telecommunications Strategy in Mo-
rocco, FIRSTMONDAY.ORG, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue91/ibahrine/index.
html.
188. Bj6rn Wellenius & Carlo Maria Rossotto, Introducing Telecommunications Compe-
tition through a Wireless License: Lessons from Morocco, PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE PRIVATE
SECTrOR, Note No. 199, November 1999, at 1.
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id. at 3, 4.
191. Id. at 3; see also Enterprise Ireland, Areas of Opportunity in Morocco, http://www.
enterprise-ireland.com/Contact/Overseas+Offices/Areas+of+Opportunity+in+Mo-
rocco.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
192. See Vivendi Universal, Vivendi Universal Takes 35% Stake in Maroc Telecom
as Part of a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement on Content (Dec. 12,
2000), http://www.vivendiuniversal.com/ir/en/press_2000/20001222_VivendiUni-
versal-takes_35_stake-inMarocTelecom-as part_of-acomprehensive str.php.
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undertaking construction activities, which discriminates against
medium-sized foreign construction companies. There are also
many examples of discriminatory licensing and registration pro-
cedures. Therefore, an opening of construction markets and
government procurement rules in emerging countries would not
only benefit EC trade but would also strengthen the capacities of
emerging economies.
1. India's Interest in the EC-India Trade Relations
So what is India interested in? The EU is India's largest
trading partner with twenty-one percent of Indian exports.'93 In-
dia is interested in more access to the EU service market since
India is an efficient service supplier in sectors such as Informa-
tion Technology ("IT") and software, engineering, and call-cen-
ters. There is a tremendous IT human capital in South Indian
cities such as Bangalore and Hyderabad.' 94 India has also a
great interest in the export of textiles as well as in the pharma-
ceutical industry.195
Another key issue where India has a great interest is in the
so-called Mode 4 of the GATS (temporary migration).196 Mode
4 commitments allow people to travel to another WTO country
to provide services for a short period of time. Mode 4, however,
is not about access to local labor markets and should therefore
be clearly distinguished from economic immigration. In fact,
the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons stipulates
that the GATS "shall not apply to measures affecting natural per-
sons seeking access to the employment market of a member, nor
shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or em-
193. See generally European Commission, India, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/
bilateral/countries/india/indexen.htm (last visited May 20, 2008).
194. See G. Balatchandirane, IT Clusters in India 5 (Institute of Developing Econo-
mies Discussion Paper No. 85, January 2007).
195. See EurActiv.com, India's Pharmaceutical Industry Goes Global (May 6, 2008),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/health/india-pharmaceutical-industry-goes-global/arti-
cle-172137.
196. For the purpose of this Article, a clear semantic and conceptual distinction is
acknowledged between temporary migration (i.e., Mode 4 of the WTO General Agree-
ment on Trade Services ("GATS")) and immigration (which implies permanent resi-
dency in a country to which one is not native). See Hamid Mamdouh, Director, Trade in
Services Division, WTO, Mode 4: Definition, Commitments, State of Play in the Negoti-
ations, Address Before WTO Symposium "Mode 4 of the GATS-Taking Stock and
Moving Forward" (Sept. 22-23, 2008).
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ployment on a permanent basis." ' Furthermore, the scope of
coverage of Mode 4 is limited to the category of "service sup-
plier." ' Therefore, a controversy arises because Mode 4 may be
associated with immigration policy, since Mode 4 could become
the backdoor to immigration and have implications on educa-
tion, health systems, and other social benefits provided in the
EU, for example, that do not exist in other countries. This rela-
tionship between the two concepts (Mode 4 and immigration
policy), however, does not appear anywhere in the GATS. In this
respect, a major success of the Doha Development Agenda
would be for the WTO membership to agree conceptually on the
scope of Mode 4.
In the United States, members of the U.S. Congress "have
warned on several occasions that they will oppose any conces-
sions on Mode 4, arguing that the issue is an immigration issue
rather than a trade matter." 99 The United States has been
under pressure from developing countries to improve its com-
mitments on Mode 4. "India in particular wants Washington to
allow more of its computer professionals to work temporarily in
the United States, but the issue is extremely controversial be-
cause of its link to immigration issues, particularly since the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and heightened security in the
wake of those attacks." 20 0
Since there is no categorization in Mode 4, the only infor-
mal requirements are: 1) That the service be temporary, and 2)
That the service provider not seek permanent entry in the labor
market of the WTO member where the service takes place. How-
ever, the question remains: Which type of service providers will
not seek permanent entry in the labor market? Once again,
Mode 4 creates a division between developed and developing
countries of the WTO in the sense that developed countries do
not want Mode 4 to become a substitute for immigration-the
argument being that there is already immigration in developed
197. GATS, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the
Agreement, 2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/serv--e/8-anmvnt-e.
htm.
198. GATT 1947 art. 1.2 (d), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragree-
ments/gatt.pdf.
199. See US. Signals Possible Movement on Mode 4 in WTO Services Talks, 25 ITR 1090
(2008).
200. Id.
394 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:345
countries-whereas developing countries want a full practice of
Mode 4 as temporary migration.2 °'
According to Pascal Lamy, opening Mode 4 may generate
benefits for both originating and receiving countries. For
originating countries the benefits are in terms of remittances
and the development of human capital. Receiving countries also
benefit from the increased mobility of services suppliers. Mode
4 can therefore be a win-win game.2 °2 Yet, it is in this Mode 4
where we find the greatest discrepancy among EU Member
States in services trade: some EU countries are in favor of liber-
alizing Mode 4, whereas others are more reluctant in other
countries.
With its extensive use of skilled and unskilled labor, the con-
struction sector is strongly affected by limitations on the move-
ment of natural persons in WTO members in general. National-
ity and residency requirements or other staffing requirements
for persons employed by foreign firms could constitute limita-
tions on market access and national treatment. 20 3 Requirements
to employ and train local staff may place a burden on the sup-
plier. Such requirements, even if imposed on an equal basis to
all domestic as well as foreign firms, could still constitute de
facto national treatment limitations.20 4
It is argued that Mode 4 of the GATS remains essentially
subject to strict domestic regulations and limitations.2 °5  Yet
201. Interview with Mr. Jos6 Plaza, Spanish trade diplomat dealing with interna-
tional services trade in Madrid, Spain (Mar. 15, 2006) (on file with author).
202. See Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner, Doha Success Will Need Positive
Outcome in Services, Speech delivered at European Services Forum and the London
School of Economics conference (Oct. 15, 2007).
203. According to the scheduling guidelines in document MTN.GNS/W/164, na-
tionality requirements are normally considered as limitations on market access
(equivalent to a zero quota), whereas a residency requirement would need to be judged
on a case-by-case basis whether it constitutes a de facto national treatment limitation or
a non-discriminatory measure subject to the disciplines of Article VI.5. See Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round, MTN.GNS/W/164 (1993).
204. GATS Article XVII.3 states that "Formally identical or formally different treat-
ment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competi-
tion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services
or service suppliers of any other Member." GATT 1947, supra note 198, art. XVII.3
(emphasis added).
205. Similar arguments are made by Pascal Lamy: "[T]errorism is about increas-
ing instability; global trade rules are about promoting stability," Pascal Lamy, EU Trade
Commissioner, Speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Sept. 8,
2007), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/spp66_e.htm.
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many countries accept the importance of temporary migration
as a necessary element to become more competitive in a knowl-
edge-based society in the world.2 "6 In Europe, a new global ap-
proach is needed so that migration strikes the right balance
among the risk of labor market shortages, economic impacts,
negative social consequences, integration policies, and external
policy objectives. 20 7 Moreover, "the changing demands of an
ageing society and a labour market in constant evolution have
challenged established assumptions about migration from
outside the EU." 20
However, in the UK, a study published by the House of
Lords concluded that immigration has a very small impact on
GDP per capita, whether positive or negative. This conclusion is
in line with findings of studies of the economic impacts of immi-
gration in other countries including the United States. Further-
more, the report found no systematic empirical evidence to sug-
gest that net immigration creates significant dynamic benefits
for the resident population in the UK. Moreover, it is possible
that there are also negative dynamic and wider welfare effects. 209
These conclusions are, in my opinion, unfortunate as immi-
grants tend to be better workers than natives, willing to work
more for less.
2. What the EU can Offer
What can the EU offer India? The EU is prepared to offer
predominantly business services such as financial services or tele-
communications, which appear feasible to some extent. Services
are critical for any economy. The services sector currently con-
tributes more to economic growth and job creation worldwide
than any other sector. In Europe, services account for over sev-
enty-seven percent of the GDP and employment. Despite this,
206. SeeJos6 Maneul Barroso, President of the European Commission, Press Con-
ference Speech, Speech/07/650 Strasbourg (Oct. 23, 2007).
207. See H. Brcker &J. Von Weizsdcker, Migration Policy: At The Nexus Of Internal
And External Migration, in A FRAGMENTED PowER: EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
226, 228 (A. Sapir ed., 2007).
208. Commission, The European Interest: Succeeding in the Age of Globalisation,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM
(2007) 581 Final, 4-5 (Oct. 3, 2007).
209. HOUSE OF LoRDs, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAiRS, VOLUME I: RE-
PORT, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION, 2007-08, H.L. 82-1, at 58-59.
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services currently still represent less than thirty percent of Euro-
pean external trade. 21" This demonstrates that trade liberaliza-
tion in the services sector is of great importance for the EU. Fur-
thermore, in a speech given by Lord Vallance of the European
Services Forum to the EU-India Business Summit on 12 October
2006, he said that developed and developing countries will miss
out on enormous potential economic gains because services
have once again been taken hostage of agriculture even
though the latter represents only eight percent of world trade
and two percent of developed countries' economies.21'
C. China
The EU is currently China's largest trading partner.
"China's trade expansion started in 1978, when the country initi-
ated reforms and opening-up policies." For the past decade, its
position as a strong player in international trade has been re-
markable. ' 212 Structural reforms in China, including trade liber-
alization, have resulted in annual real GDP growth rates in ex-
cess of ten percent over the past four years, rising per capita in-
come and poverty reduction. In the process, China has become
the world's third largest trader.21 3
In early 1978, a trade agreement was concluded between
the EEC and China, which was replaced by a Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation Agreement between China and the EEC in
1985.214 The European Community continues to work towards
improving bilateral trade relationships. Commissioners Peter
Mandelson and Benita Ferrero-Waldner met with Chinese trade
Minister Bo Xilai on November 4, 2005 to discuss the Doha trade
round, but also a wide range of issues including the environ-
ment, energy and intellectual property.215 The first EU-China
Strategic Dialogue at Vice Foreign Minister Level was held in
210. European Services Forum, Position Paper on EU Free Trade Agreements 2
(Feb. 28 2008).
211. See Lord Vallance of Tummel, Chairman of the European Services Forum,
Speech at the Seventh EU-India Business Summit in Helsinki (Oct. 12, 2006).
212. Renfeng Zhao, China and India: A comparison of trade, investment and expansion
strategies, 2 CHATHAM HoUSE, June 1, 2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/
9201_010607workshop.pdf.
213. See generally Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review: Report by China,
WT/TPR/G/199 (May 7, 2008) (reviewing expansion and problems encountered).
214. Council Regulation No. 2616/85, O.J. L 250/1 (1985).
215. Commission Press Release, IP/05/1374 (Nov. 4, 2005).
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London in December 2005.216 At the Ninth EU-China Summit
in September 2006 in Helsinki, the EU and China agreed on
opening negotiations for a new comprehensive framework
agreement covering topics such as energy, sustainable develop-
ment, cooperation in Africa, and the protection of intellectual
property rights. This was due largely to the mutual agreement
by both parties that the current 1985 agreement no longer re-
flects the scope, depth, or overall nature of their current rela-
tionship.217
So, negotiations about a more comprehensive Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement ("PCA") started in January 2007.
The new PCA will cover all components of the EU-China rela-
tionship and provide a comprehensive management framework.
The prospective PCA is expected to lay the foundation
for enhanced cooperation, including the enforcement and,
where possible, the upgrading of environmental, social, la-
bour and safety standards. It will also hold comprehensive
dialogues on over 20 ongoing sectoral dialogues with a view
to promote cooperation in all sectors, including on economic
and financial matters, in both bilateral and multilateral fora.
With regard to these existing sectoral agreements, the PCA
will complement rather than replace these agreements.
In general, the PCA will be negotiated on the basis of a
commitment to the principles of good governance, the rule
of law, effective multilateralism, the fight against corruption
and improved transparency. As such the PCA will contain a
standard clause on human rights. The PCA will foster coop-
eration to find international solutions to global issues such as
climate change, including energy cooperation, by stimulating
energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy.
Increased cooperation will also be sought in education, cul-
ture and science. It is envisaged there will be increased grass-
roots level peer-to-peer exchanges of unions, students, aca-
demics, business associations, non-governmental organisa-
tions and other areas of cooperation. 218
216. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU-CHINA RELATIONS: CHRONOLOGY 1975-JAN. 2007,
4, available at ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/docs/07_chronology-jan-07.pdf.
217. EUROPEAN UNION,Joint Statement of the Ninth EU-China Summit (Sept. 9, 2006),
http://www.eu2006.fi/news-and_documents/otherdocuments/vko36/enGB/11578
28673423/.
218. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TRADE SUSTAINABILITY IMPACr ASSESSMENT OF THE NE-
GOTIATIONS OF A PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EU AND
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However, although cooperation dialogues between the EU
and China already exist on many levels, a free-trade agreement
between the EC and China is not on the horizon since it would
alienate other EC trading partners and it would create much re-
sistance from within the EU and from third countries. China is
already very competitive without an FTA with the EC. China at-
tempts to establish itself as a gravity center in Asia by concluding
many low-quality, politically motivated bilateral FTAs in the re-
gion.219 One wonders the extent to which China is serious about
multilateralism, given China's minimal involvement in it. China
is a strong economic power with increasingly sophisticated pro-
duction in the coastal regions. Peter Sutherland argues that,
since joining the WTO in December 2001, China has enjoyed
significant economic growth. The rigorous economic regulation
requirements needed to join the WTO have worked as a catalyst
for Chinese political and economic reform.220
Yet, China insists on keeping the status of a developing
country despite its size both economically (currently, the fourth
largest economy in the world) and demographically (the most
populated country in the world). Compared to the other BRIC
countries which are WTO members,2 l China plays a rather
timid role both in the Doha Round 222 as well as in the WTO's
dispute settlement system.2 23 China has brought only two cases
CHINA-DRAFT GLOBAL ANALYSIS REPORT 2008 10 (2008), available at http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/september/tradoc_140589.pdf.
219. Recent FTAs signed by China include those with ASEAN countries, Hong
Kong, Macao, Pakistan, as well as the Gulf countries. See Trade Policy Review Body,
Trade Policy Review: Report by the People's Republic of China, 77-82, WTrI/TPR/G/161
(Mar. 17 2006).
220. Peter Sutherland, Transforming Nations, 87 FOREIGN AF'., 125-36 (2008).
221. We are referring here to Brazil and India, the public lobbyists on behalf of
the emerging markets, which are much more multilaterally pro-active than is the case of
China. For a comparison between China and India in the WTO, see generally, Julia Ya
Qin, China, India, and the Law of the World Trade Organization, 3 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1
(2008).
222. When asked by the United States to issue a joint statement in support of the
Doha Development Association ("DDA") in 2006, China refused. See China Balked at
Joint Statement of Support for WfO Talks, US Official Says, BNA 'ATO REPORTER (Apr. 19,
2006).
223. In the first years right after China's accession to the WTO, China's inclination
was to handle trade disputes through negotiation rather than WTO adjudication.
When threatened with 'A'TO litigation during its initial years of 'ATo membership,
China opted to compromise to avoid formal 'vrrO complaints. See, e.g., EC Threatens
WTO Suit Against China Unless it Lifts Coking-Coal Restrictions, BNA WITO REPORTER (May
25, 2004).
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before the WTO as complainant,224 compared to more than fif-
teen cases brought by India and more than twenty by Brazil.
Why? Arguably, because China is a rather young WTO member,
it still needs to improve its skills and competences on WTO mat-
ters; culturally, it tends to avoid disputes225 since the country has
much influence from Confucius; 22' and it has a rather inefficient
bureaucracy.227 For the Doha negotiations to succeed, greater
leadership from China is necessary. China should play a more
prominent role in the international economic institutions. In
this sense, the EU expects "China to assume a responsibility com-
mensurate with the benefits it derives from the [world] trading
system."228 Why? Because with greater power and a greater
voice comes greater responsibility.
There are many differences and difficulties between the EU
and China in the trade field: the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights, 22 1 counterfeiting and product piracy, China's delay in
enforcing WTO rules, China's competitive advantage from poor
social and environmental standards, and unfair subsidies to fa-
vored national industries, (which is a manifest violation of one of
the fundamental principles of WTO law, that of no unfair
trade) 230 to name but a few.2 1 According to the European Com-
224. Dispute Settlement Body, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS252 (May 30, 2008); Dispute Settlement Body, United
States-Preliminary Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet
Paper from China, WAT/DS368 (Sept. 18, 2007).
225. On this point, see Henry Gao, Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience
and Lessons for China, in CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 315-51 (Henry Gao & Don-
ald Lewis eds., 2005).
226. See, e.g., ZAKARIA, supra note 67, at 109-14 (explaining the correlation between
the Chinese legal system and Confucianism).
227. This attitude, however, is slowly changing to a more aggressive and proactive
role of China in the WTO. See Henry Gao, China's Participation in the WFO: A Lawyer's
Perspective, 11 SINGAPORE Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 34 (2007).
228. European Commission, Global Europe: EU-China Trade and Investment:
Competition and Partnership, at 14.
229. See generally, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
(June 2, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/intell-property/iprchina
en.htm (describing the activities of the Intellectual Property ("IP") Working Group).
230. See generally, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, RESPECTING THE RULES (July 2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/indexen.htm (last visited May 21,
2008) (comparing EU trade policy instruments to WTO rules).
231. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU USES WTO CHINA TRADE POLICY REVIEW (TPR) TO
RAISE QUESTIONS OF FAIR TREATMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, (May 23,
2008), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/china/pr230508_en.htm
[hereinafter EU USES TRADE POLICY REVIEW].
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mission, "China is the single most important challenge for EU
trade policy. ' 23 2 As argued by former Trade Commissioner
Mandelson, "doing business in China remains attractive. How-
ever, it is equally clear that much work needs to be done to cre-
ate a level playing field for European companies, concerning
market access, transparency and protection of intellectual prop-
erty. '  The Chinese market is still relatively closed to the goods
Europe seeks to export. 23 4 China may have lowered its tariffs
substantially since 2001, but barriers 'behind the border' in the
Chinese market are costing European businesses more than
EUR 20 billion every year in lost exports. 235 Nevertheless, as can
be seen in the chart, when comparing with the rest of the BRIC
countries, China is the main partner for both EU imports and
exports236:
Sham of EU trade with kividial BRIC countries
Exports Impots
souro Eurslat
1. Possible Ways to Improve the EC-China Trade Relations
What can the EU do in the trade field to improve its rela-
tions with China? Can trade policy be used to improve bilateral
relations with China and induce China to be more responsible
and multilateral? Cooperation has a priority despite the fact that
232. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Woking Docu-
ment Accompanying COM (2006) 631 Final; A policy Paper on EU-China Trade and
Investment: Competition and Partnership, COM (2006) 632 Final (Oct. 24, 2006) 3.
233. European Commission, Mandelson Discusses Opportunities, Barriers in China with
EU Business (Sept. 17, 2008) available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/
countries/ china/ prl70908_en.htm (last visited Sep. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Opportuni-
ties, Barriers in China].
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. According to the European Commission, the EU "treats China as a normal
and important trading partner." EU Uses Trade Policy Review, supra note 231, para. 1.
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the European Commission has mentioned in the past the use of
tougher measures if China does not rectify some of its actions.
Perhaps an extension of a high-level strategic dialogue 2 37 similar
to the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue would make
sense. In this sense, Commission President Barroso and Chinese
Prime Minister Wen launched a new EU-China High Level Eco-
nomic and Trade Dialogue Mechanism in Beijing on April 25,
2008.238 Proposed by the Chinese authorities and approved at
the EU-China Beijing summit in November 2007, this mecha-
nism will strengthen the dialogue between both sides, and will
provide a new tool for dealing with the problems confronting
European companies trying to establish themselves in China, es-
pecially in the fields of investment, market access, and protec-
tion of intellectual property rights. 2 9
Other constructive approaches could be the launch of a co-
operation program with China on intellectual property protec-
tion, closer cooperation between the EU and the United States
on intellectual property rights with a joint action in key markets
such as China, or the creation of an intellectual property rights
helpdesk for EU businesses in China. However, China has
grown very self-confident in recent years and knows that EU
businesses depend on access to the Chinese market.
D. Russia
There is a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
("PCA") between the European Communities and their Member
States and the Russian Federation. 240 The agreement was signed
in 1994 and entered into force on December 1, 1997. The
agreement regulates the political, economic, and cultural rela-
tions between the EU and Russia and is the legal basis for the
237. In this sense, the favorable views of former Commissioner Mandelson toward
dialogue rejected trade boycotts against China, as such moves only damage the interests
of ordinary Europeans and Chinese. Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner,
Speech at the China-Britain Business Council, London (Apr. 5, 2008), http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/commission barroso/mandelson/speeches-articles/sppml99_en.htm.
238. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU AN) CHINA START HIGH-LEVEL ECONOMIC AND
TRADE TALKS (Apr. 25, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/
china/pr250408 en.htm (last visited May 22, 2008).
239. See generally Opportunities, Barriers in China, supra note 233.
240. See Council and Commission Decision No. 97/800/EC, 0.J. L 327 (1997)
("Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and
their Member States.").
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EC's bilateral trade with Russia. One of its main objectives is the
promotion of trade and investment as well as the development
of harmonious economic relations between the parties. Al-
though trade is growing between the EU and Russia, it remains
largely concentrated in the energy and minerals sectors, al-
though trade in services in growing rapidly too.
The EU and the Russian Federation are planning to start
negotiations on a new PCA to provide the contractual framework
for EU-Russia relations in the years to come, thereby replacing
the existing ten-plus-year old PCA.24 ' This new legally binding
agreement would provide a sustainable and comprehensive
framework for bilateral relations. Although both sides seemed
comfortable with each other at the June 2008 EU-Russia summit
held in Khanty-Mansiysk (Russia),242 tensions remain. The two
sides also diverged as regards the form that the new Partnership
Agreement should take, with Russian President Medvedev voic-
ing support for a document that is "short, without too many de-
tails,"241 while the EU wants a more detailed text, with precise
wording on energy and security issues in particular. "The new
agreement should be inextricably linked with Russia's advance-
ment in democratic standards, rule of law, and human rights. In
economy it should incorporate-among others-the principles
of the Energy Charter Treaty and its Transit Protocol," said lib-
eral Polish Member of European Parliament ("MEP") Janusz
Onyszkiewicz, European Parliament's rapporteur on the EU-Rus-
sia agreement. 244
"In this context, once Russia has acceded to the WTO, the
EU is eager to pursue, a deep and comprehensive economic in-
tegration agreement between the EU and Russian [interdepen-
dent] economies, building on but going beyond the PCA and
241. SeeJoint Statement of the EU-Russia Summit on the Launch of Negotiations
for a New EU-Russia Agreement, June 27, 2008, http://www.eu2008.si/includes/
Downloads/misc/JSNegotiationEU-RFAgreement.pdf.
242. See EurActiv.com, EU-Russia Welcome "New Page" in Relationship (June 30,
2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-russia-welcome-new-page-rela-
tionship/article-173764 [hereinafter EU-Russia Welcome New Page].
243. Stephen Castle, In a Shift, Medvedev Makes Nice with the EU, INr'L HERALD TRm-
UNE, June 28, 2008, at 4, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/27/eu-
rope/union.php.
244. EU-Russia Welcome New Page, supra note 242, para. 7.
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WTO provisions. ''1 45 However, negotiations for a new PCA had
not started due to objections by Poland because of the Russian
ban on Polish meat and vegetables, where Russia claims that the
meat contains excessive levels of antibiotics.246 In addition, Lith-
uania also objected, which the EU's rotating President at the
time (Slovenia) heavily criticized for not withdrawing its objec-
tions to initiating talks on a new PCA between the EU and Rus-
sia.24 7 Lithuania wanted to obtain assurances from Russia over
certain issues including energy supply and involvement in re-
gional conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.248 These difficulties,
however, were solved on May 27, 2008, when EU foreign minis-
ters formally approved launching talks with Russia over a new
PCA-an issue that had been deadlocked for almost two years.24 9
However, due to the disproportionate Russian reaction to the
attack of South Ossetia capital by Georgian forces in August
2008, EU leaders decided to postpone the talks conditional on
Russian troops withdrawing completely from the positions prior
to the August invasion.250
A key feature of the talks will be energy relations, with the
EU increasingly concerned by gas disputes between Russia and
neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, through which supplies
to the twenty-seven-nation bloc must be brought. Brussels is also
seeking to diversify its energy supplies in order to overcome the
EU's dependency on Russia.25 1 To this end, the EU offered in
September 2008 financial and political support for a EUR 15 bil-
245. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, RUSSIA, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/
countries/russia/indexen.htm (last visited May 23, 2008).
246. Mark Leonard & Nicu Popescu, A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations, EURO-
PEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Nov. 2 2007, at 50.
247. EurActiv.com, EU Presidency Upset Over Lithuanian Veto of EU-Russia Ac-
cord (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-presidency-upset-
lithuanian-veto-eu-russia-accord/article-172090.
248. Press Release Slovenian Presidency of the EU, Agreement on Start of Negotia-
tions for New Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russian Federation (May
11, 2008), http://www.eu2008.si/en/News andDocuments/PressReleases/May/
0511MZZrusija.html (last visited June 1, 2008).
249. For an overview of the backing of the long-awaited launch of negotiations
between the EU and Russia, see EurActiv.com, EU to Give Green Light to Russia Talks
(May 26, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/eu-give-green-light-russia-
talks/article-1 72659.
250. See EurActiv.com, EU Contemplates 'Common Market' With Russia, (Oct. 22,
2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-contemplates-common-market-
russia/article-176575.
251. EurActiv.com, EU-Russia Summit: Medvedev Follows in Putin's Footsteps
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lion trans-Saharan pipeline to carry natural gas from Nigeria to
European markets.25 2 The planned 4300 kilometer pipeline
would stretch across Nigeria, Niger, and Algeria, where gas
would be shipped to Spain and Italy. A week before the EU's
offer for the trans-Saharan project, and to cooperate on gas ex-
ploration, production, and transportation, Gazprom, the Rus-
sian energy giant, signed a memorandum of understanding with
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation in Moscow. 2 53
The simultaneous moves by Brussels and Moscow illustrate the
scramble for natural resources as continued growth in the global
economy fuels ever-increasing demand for energy.2 5 4
Currently, there are large problems in the political sphere
between the EU and Russia, based on conflicts and mistrust. In
fact, when Peter Mandelson was EU trade commissioner, he
used to say that the current phase is the hardest since the late
1990s and that it is a serious test of the EU-Russia relationship.
An issue of bilateral tension between Russia and the EU is energy
security. Another issue is the trade conflict because of the Rus-
sian ban on Polish meat on health grounds discussed earlier,
and the fact that on April 1, 2008 Russia increased its duties on
exports of wood. According to the European Commission
spokesman for trade,
These increased duties will have significant economic impact
on the wood processing industry in the EU. It will make it
more difficult to source wood from Russia and hinder trade
flows in this product. It may also have further negative eco-
nomic consequences in terms of plant closures and job losses.
We therefore regret the decision by the Russian Federation to
raise export duties for wood.255
"Sweden and Finland have complained that Moscow's plans to
sharply increase its timber export taxes-from the current 25%
of raw timber value to 80% at the beginning of 2009-will hurt
(June 24, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-russia-summit-
medvedev-follows-putin-footsteps/article-1 73595.
252. EurActiv.com, EU and Russia in Scramble for Nigerian Gas (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-russia-scramble-nigerian-gas/article-1 75509
[hereinafter Nigerian Gas].
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See European Commission, Trade Issues, EU Response to Increase in Russian Ex-
port Duties for Timber, para. 1 (Apr. 1, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilat-
eral/countries/russia/pr010408_en.htm [hereinafter Export Duties Timber].
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European paper companies. '2 6 Helsinki said it was considering
taxing Russian goods crossing its territory in retaliation. 25 '7 Nev-
ertheless, the European Commission's position regarding Russia
is that of a stronger multilateral engagement of Russia: "We con-
tinue strongly to support Russia's WTO accession, which is not
just in Russia's interest, but in the interest of everyone who
trades with Russia. It is important that we make progress in this
issue and see Russia firmly anchored in the international trading
system. ' 258 This position, however, is not entirely shared in Mos-
cow as there is some skepticism about Russia's accession to the
WTO because, as a major resource exporter, it might not need
to join the WTO and because the WTO bindings and rules are
not welcomed.
259
1. Possible Ways to Improve EC-Russia Trade Relations
In this context of conflict and mistrust between the EU and
Russia, what can the EU do in the trade field to improve its rela-
tions with Russia, the largest economy in the world still outside
the WTO, which has been pursuing membership in the global
trade body for nearly fifteen years? The EC, "which is by far Rus-
sia's biggest trading partner and source of investment, has a
vested interest in smoothing out ongoing disagreements [men-
tioned above] and facilitating Moscow's entrance into the WTO.
Indeed, the twenty-seven-member trading bloc hopes to begin
negotiating a free-trade agreement with Russia once its member-
ship in the global trade body has been finalised. ' 26" Removal of
non-tariff barriers, the achievement of regulatory convergence,
and openness to investment flows seem necessary to benefit from
a real common European economic space. 26' However, neither
256. Despite Obstacles, EU Expects Russia to Join WTO This Year, 12 BRIDGES WEEKLY
TRADE NEWS DIGEST 4, June 25, 2008, para. 6, available at http://www.ictsd.net/i/news/
bridgeweekly/12267/ [hereinafter Russia to Join WTO].
257. See generally Russia and Finland at Loggerheads Over Timber Taxation, BRIDGES,
Aug. 2008, 21, available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridges/27601/ (last visited 10/30/
08) [hereinafter Russia and Finland at Loggerheads].
258. Export Duties Timber, supra note 255, para. 2 (quoting Peter Power, European
Commission spokesman).
259. See generally Russia and Finland at Loggerheads, supra note 257.
260. Russia to Join WTO, supra note 256, para. 11.
261. Peter Mandelson, European Commissioner for Trade, Russia and the EU:
Building Trust on a Shared Continent, Speech at Conference "Russia in the 21st Cen-
tury," (June 19, 2008) http://ec.europa.eu/commission barroso/mandelson/speeches
_articles/sppm208_en.htm [hereinafter Mandelson: Building Trust].
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a free-trade agreement nor WTO accession seems overly attrac-
tive for Russia, given that Russian energy exports are in good
demand in the world and are not subject to restrictions.2 6 2
Notwithstanding this,
Russia has made significant progress in its WTO acces-
sion talks, having already signed protocols with more than 60
WTO member states. All applicants for [WTO] membership
must negotiate bilateral accords with any WTO member that
requests one. As with most WTO decisions, any single Mem-
ber has the power to block Russian accession. The only bilat-
eral talks that remain unresolved are the negotiations with...
Ukraine and Georgia .... Despite historic strains on trade
issues between the two countries . . . , Kiev has indicated that
it intends to help facilitate Moscow's membership in the
global trade body.263
As for Georgia, although it completed a bilateral accession
deal with Moscow in 2004, it withdrew its signature from that
agreement two years later.2 6 4 Georgia "again broke off bilateral
talks with Russia in April [2008], saying that it would veto Rus-
sia's bid unless the country agreed to stop operating customs
checkpoints in Georgia's separatist territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. [Georgia] also wants [Russia] to lift its ban on
imports of Georgian wine and other products. '265 In August
2008, Georgian troops invaded the breakaway region of South
Ossetia. "South Ossetia and Abkhazia are officially part of the
territory of Georgia, but are in fact autonomous and largely
under Russian influence.... Russia responded with massive mil-
itary action, invading part of Georgia. ' 266 This incident will cer-
tainly not persuade Georgia to facilitate Russia's accession to the
WTO. The EU delegation to Russia, led by French President
Sarkozy on September 8, 2008, nevertheless succeeded in con-
vincing Russian President Medvedev to agree to a complete with-
drawal of troops from Georgia.267
262. See id.
263. See Russia to Join WTO, supra note 256, para. 13.
264. End of Road not yet in Sight for Russia's WTO Accession, 10 BIDGES WEEKLY
TRADE NEWS DIGEST 35, Oct. 25, 2006, http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/6382/.
265. Russia to Join WrO, supra note 256, para. 14.
266. EurActiv.com, Extraordinary EU summit may be convened over Georgia,
(Aug. 18, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/extraordinary-eu-summit-
may-convened-georgia/article-I 74744.
267. See EurActiv.com, EU to Keep Peace After Moscow OKs Georgia Pull-Out
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Michael Emerson argues that it would be in the West's inter-
est to include Russia in its political, economic and security plans,
as both aim at common objectives. 268 "[T]rue partnership be-
tween Russia and the EU [seems] essential to security and pros-
perity on [the European] continent in the twenty-first [cen-
tury] ."269 Furthermore, cooperation seems to be a plausible way
to improve relations with Russia.2 7' This is not always easy since
there are contradictory positions of the EU toward Russia.2 71
The new EU Member States do not think in the same way as the
old EU Member States vis-A-vis Russia for historical reasons.
272
At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia
agreed to reinforce cooperation with a view to creating four EU/
Russia common spaces, within the framework of the existing
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It was decided to cre-
ate a common economic space; a common space of freedom,
security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of exter-
nal security; as well as a space of research and education, includ-
ing cultural aspects.
2 7 1
Regarding the common economic space ("CES"), it aims
at increasing opportunities for economic operators, a further
(Sept. 9, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-keep-peace-moscow-oks-
georgia-pull/article-175198 (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
268. See Michael Emerson, Time to Think of a Strategic Bargain with Russia, CENTRE
FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, POLICY BRIEF No. 160, May 2008, shop.ceps.eu/down
free.php?itemid= 1649.
269. See generally Mandelson: Building Trust, supra note 261.
270. Pami Aalto argues that the difficult question of the EU's responsibilities to-
ward Russia is best approached as a problem of community. Applying a broad notion of
the wider European community can make it easier for the Union to be sensitive vis-A-vis
its gigantic neighbor to the east and, as a consequence, to define its policies toward it.
The issue of belonging and identity are thus fundamental to delineating the EU's re-
sponsibilities toward Russia regardless of whether we speak of the EU-Russia strategic
partnership or the regional cooperation level. See Pami Aalto, The EU, Russia and the
Problem of Community, in A RESPONSIBLE EUROPE? ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU EXTER-
NAL AFFAIRS 98-118 (Hartmut Mayer & Henri Vogt eds., 2006).
271. In Fraser Cameron's view, speaking with one voice vis-A-vis Russia, although it
is difficult in some areas, is likely to produce far greater benefits for the EU than trying
to cut bilateral deals. See EurActiv.com, EU-Russia Relations "Should Be Bore Positive"
(Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/cameron-eu-russia-rela-
tions-positive/article-171457.
272. See id.
273. See European Commission Delegation,Joint Statement on the 300th Anniver-
saty of St. Petersburg-Celebrating Three Centuries of Common European History and
Culture (May 31, 2003), http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p-234.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2008).
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step towards establishing a more open and integrated market
between the EU and Russia.2 74 The main objective of the
CES is to put in place the conditions for increased and diver-
sified trade and creat[e] new investment opportunities by
pursuing economic integration, elimination of trade barriers,
regulatory convergence, market opening, trade facilitation
and infrastructure development by closer cooperation, ex-
change of information, and sharing of best practices.275
The roadmap on the common economic space was adopted at
the EU-Russia Summit in Moscow on May 10, 2005 and provides
for various dialogue fora. 276 The idea behind the common eco-
nomic space is to prepare the ground for a future and deep free-
trade agreement. 277 However, there has been little substantial
progress so far.
In sum, Russia's economy, although strong, still has struc-
tural weaknesses. It needs to diversify its economy into other sec-
tors such as services and investment in critical parts of infrastruc-
ture. 2 7 8  Moreover, education and research are under-
resourced.279 In this sense, it is worth noting that Russia has
formed a new government body designed to control foreign in-
vestment in so-called "strategic" sectors, whereby acquisitions of
interest exceeding twenty-five percent of voting shares in Rus-
sia's strategic commercial organizations by foreign investors
must be approved by a special governmental commission.28 °
Furthermore, "companies operating in 'strategic' sectors cannot
place more than 25% of shares outside Russia .... Russian com-
panies doing geological exploration and extraction of resources
at strategic deposits are not allowed to place more than 5% of
shares overseas."
281
274. European Commission, Russia: The European Union and the Russian Federation
Have a Strong Trade Relationship. Bilateral Trade and Investments Continue to Grow Rapidly,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/indexen.htm (last vis-
ited May 23, 2008).
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See generally Mandelson: Building Trust, supra note 261.
279. See id.
280. Sergei Blagov, Russia Sets Up New Commission to Control Foreign Investment in 42
Strategic Sectors, VITO REPORTER, July 17, 2008, http://ippubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/ITD.
NSF/877e5e80771 11ce485256b57005bf525/494acb22ble0040285257482007f99b4?
OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
281. Id.
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2. Note on Energy Security
28 2
As mentioned above, the CES provides for various dialogue
fora, the most relevant of which is certainly the energy dia-
logue. 28' At the Sixth EU-Russia Summit on October 30, 2000, it
was agreed to institutionalize an energy dialogue on a regular
basis between the EU and Russia to enable progress to be made
in the definition and arrangements for an EU-Russia Energy
Partnership. 28 4 "Russia has been a reliable supplier of energy
into the EU for many years, despite periods of internal difficul-
ties. 285 Likewise, the EU continues to be the dominant market
for Russian energy exports. This strong mutual interest and in-
terdependence means that energy is an ideal sector in which re-
lations can be progressed significantly... for the further devel-
opment of an EU-Russia strategic partnership.
28 6
EU dependency on Russian gas imports is currently over
forty percent and is expected to rise considerably in the coming
decades, unless supply sources are diversified and/or greater
emphasis is placed on locally generated renewable sources of en-
282. By energy security, we mean the protecting against
[T]hreats of supply and price disruptions arising from risks associated with the
sources of [oil and] gas supplies, the transit of [oil and] gas supplies, and the
facilities through which oil and gas are delivered. There are two major
dimensions of these risks: short-term supply availability versus long-term
adequacy of supply and the infrastructure for delivering this supply to
markets; operational security of [oil and] gas markets, i.e. daily and seasonal
stresses and strains of extreme weather and other operational problems versus
strategic security, i.e., catastrophic failure of major supply sources and facilities.
Jonathan Stern, Security of European Natural Gas Supplies: The Impact of Import Dependence
and Liberalization, ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, July 2002, at 6.
283. See VICTOR KHRISTENKO, RUSSIAN MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND ENERGY & FRAN-
coIs LAMOUREUX, EUROPEAN COMMISON DIRECTOR-GENERAL, EU-RuSSIA ENERGY DIA-
LOGUE: SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT, October 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/
jointprogress/doc/progress6_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (addressing security,
investment, sustainable development, transportation, energy technology, market devel-
opment, and nuclear energy).
284. See Charles Grant & Katinka Barysch, The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, Centre for
European Reform (May 2003), http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/biefing-eu-russia.pdf (last
visted Oct. 21, 2008) (reporting on the progress of and obstacles to the energy partner-
ship).
285. For an analysis of Russia's exponential macroeconomic success based on en-
ergy supply, see LocIo VINHAS DE SOUZA, A DIFFERNT COUNTRY, RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC
RESURGENCE 73-82 (2008).
286. European Commission, European Union-Russia Energy Dialogue, http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/overview/why-en.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
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ergy.287 Unlike oil, which can be transported easily in tankers,
gas is still transported mainly via pipelines, making Europe de-
pendent on existing supply and transit routes. The need for the
EU to diversify supplies was underlined by a dispute between
Ukraine and Russia in January 2006, which led to interrup-
tions to supplies of Russian gas for some EU Member States.2 88
The EU was understandably alarmed since about twenty-five per-
cent of all gas consumed in the EU originates from Russia, and
eighty percent of it is shipped via pipelines crossing Ukraine.289
"The dispute [between Ukraine and Russia] recalled a quarrel in
2006 when deliveries to Western Europe were briefly inter-
rupted, highlighting the EU's dependency on Russian gas and
prompting it to seek new supply routes. 29 ° One wonders how
reliable Russia is as an energy supplier.29'
Despite the need for the EU to diversify supplies of gas,
Greece and Russia signed an agreement on April 29, 2008, to
start construction on the South Stream Pipeline. 29 2  "South
Stream was launched in 2007 by Italy's Eni and Russia's Gaz-
prom. It is designed to pump 30 billion cubic meters of Russian
gas a year to Europe, under the Black Sea via Bulgaria, Greece,
Serbia, and Croatia to Italy. Under the plans, one of its
branches will go through Hungary, which recently joined the
project, and reach Austria. '293 However, some European offi-
cials seem to have doubts about the intentions of Gazprom. Eu-
rope's perception of Gazprom as "a political weapon of the
287. Former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzdlez voiced the importance of
tackling the issue of Europe's energy dependency at a reflection group launched by EU
leaders at a summit in December 2007. At the summit, Gonzslez asked EU leaders to
reconsider their position on nuclear power. See EurActiv.com, Gonzdlez Voices Bold
Ambitions for EU Reflection Group (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/fu-
ture-eu/gonzalez-voices-bold-ambitions-eu-reflection-group/article-I 69552.
288. See EurActiv.com, EU Seeks New Supply Routes in Wake of Russia-Ukraine
Gas Row, (June 29, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-seeks-new-supply-
routes-wake-russia-ukraine-gas-row/article-1 51692.
289. Id.
290. Vytautas Landsbergis, Why we must learn to say No to Russia, EuRoPE's WORLD
(Summer 2008), http://www.europesworld.org/Francais/EWSettings/Article/tabid/
190/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/20437/Default.aspx.
291. See id. (noting that Russia has guaranteed future supplies to the EU, possibly
as a ploy to discourage development of future competing sources).
292. See EurActiv.com, Greece Sseals Pipeline Agreement with Russia (Apr. 30,
2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/greece-seals-pipeline-agreement-russia/ar-
ticle-172044 [hereinafter Greece Seals Agreement].
293. Id.
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Kremlin" is wrong, according to top Gazprom executive Alexan-
der Medvedev,294 who claims that Gazprom is perceived by the
EU as "an instrument of Russian foreign policy. '295 Medvedev
finds statements that an increase in Gazprom's gas deliveries
constitutes a threat to the EU's security puzzling. According to
him, "[t] he suggestion that Gazprom would invest billions of dol-
lars in expensive gas export pipelines so that [the Russians]
could then disrupt them for political reasons looks absurd, espe-
cially in view of the substantial contribution these gas exports
make to Russia's budget and the country's economy. "296
Another project is the so-called Nord Stream project which
is a German-Russian plan of a Baltic Sea gas-pipeline. The "pro-
ject has come under attack from central and eastern European
countries, which fear that Russia might use the pipeline, which
bypasses their territories, to impose higher energy prices on
them. ' 29 7 Furthermore, the European Parliament is concerned
about the geopolitical implications and environmental impact of
the project.298 It is nevertheless paradoxical to note that some
EU Member States have signed agreements with Russia for the
creation of gas pipeline projects, although the aim of the EU is
to minimize its dependence on Russian energy supply.
By contrast to these two projects, another natural gas pipe-
line called Nabucco, although endangered because of the Rus-
sia-Georgia conflict in August 2008,299 would bring gas from the
Middle East and Central Asia to Europe via Turkey, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary, and Austria.3 °° The project, scheduled to be
completed by 2013, is geopolitically significant on energy-secur-
ity grounds because it will bypass Russia, but has encountered
financial problems and a lack of political will from some EU
294. See Alexander Medvedev, Is Gazprom's Strategy Political?, EUROPE'S WORLD
(Summer 2008), http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/ 191/Article
Type/Ar ticleView/ArticleID/21177/Default.aspx.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. EU-Russia Welcome New Page, supra note 242, para. 9.
298. See EurActiv.com, Baltic Pipeline Under Fire Despite Industry Assurances
(July 9, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/baltic-pipeline-fire-despite-indus-
try-assurances/article-I 74087.
299. See EurActiv.com, Nabucco: "Pie in the Sky" after Georgia Crisis? (Aug. 25
2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/nabucco-pie-sky-georgia-crisis/article-
174855 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).
300. See generally Greece Seals Agreement, supra note 292.
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Member States.3"' Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir
Chizhov dismissed the potential of the Nabucco project, espe-
cially the plans to bring gas from Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan,
arguing that the resources of the two Central Asian countries
would be insufficient. The only way to fill the Nabucco pipeline
is with Iranian gas, he said. 30 2 However, with an embargo cur-
rently on Iran, there is no .gas.30 3 Others such as Wolfgang Rut-
tenstorfer, the CEO of Osterreichische Mineralolverwaltung,
claim that there is enough gas to make Nabucco happen. 30 4 On
this note, Iraq has shown interest in selling gas to Nabucco, and
discussions have already taken place about the transfer of sub-
stantial amounts of Iraqi gas via Syria and the trans-Arabian gas
pipeline, or directly via a link between Iraq and Turkey.30 5
The following map shows the current pipelines projects of
Russian oil and natural gas:3
0 6
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303. Iran, which holds fifteen percent of the world's estimated gas reserves, is not
on the list of countries that would participate in Nabucco due to the uranium enrich-
ment row between Western countries and Tehran, which prevents the EU from devel-
oping the project with Iran.
304. See EurActiv.com, Business and Commission in Plea for Nabucco Pipeline
(July 4, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/business-commission-plea-
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Generally, the EU is in a weak position vis-A-vis Russia since
it needs energy security. Russia has been making an autocratic
use of its energy policy. The EU continues to have considerable
dependence on Russian energy supply: The share of EU imports
from Russia is thirty percent in the case of oil and forty-four per-
cent in the case of natural gas. °7 So the EU should diversify its
energy supply sources by dealing with alternative markets such as
the Middle East, Norway,308 Nigeria,' °° or Algeria. 3 0 By the
same token, Russia is dependent on its energy exports. One ma-
jor economic issue for Russia is the failure to diversify its econ-
omy. If the EU is diversifying, Russia also needs to think about
diversifying its exports to other regions of the world. Further-
more, the construction of pipelines is not cheap, and Russia
needs to secure its sources of tax revenue. 11
CONCLUSION
The EU is definitely an attractive partner for the BRIC
countries as it provides much in its trade relations. In fact, the
EU is Brazil's, Russia's, India's, and China's largest trading part-
ner. Although the EU does want cooperation with the BRIC
countries, in my opinion using trade policy as a "carrot" in a
policy-centered approach does not have much scope beyond cur-
rent existing efforts. The European Commission's Directorate-
General for external trade is already very active. So, few new
initiatives seem possible. Nevertheless, there is some, although
limited, room for trade policy concessions at the multilateral
level: with Brazil, in the case of agriculture and the Doha
Round; with India, the resistance with Mode 4 of the GATS. As
expressed earlier, the EU could offer additional incentives to the
307. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA: CLOSE
NEIGHBOURS, GLOBAL PLAYERS, STRATEGIC PARTNERS 13 (Oct. 18, 2007), http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/externalrelations/library/publications/russia -brochure07_- en.pdf.
308. That said, North Sea oil and gas fields have already been exploited beyond
their peak. See EurActiv.com, Geopolitics of EU Energy Supply (July 18, 2005), http://
www.euractiv.com/en/energy/geopolitics-eu-energy-supply/article-142665.
309. See Nigerian Gas, supra note 252.
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supplies/article-1 71622.
311. See EurActiv.com, EU 'Wrong' to Prioritise Energy Diversification, (Oct. 15,
2008), http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-wrong-prioritise-energy-
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BRIC countries by granting larger concessions at the multilateral
level or demanding fewer concessions than would be the case in
a purely reciprocal give-and-take situation.
However, even if the EU concessions were possible, what
would the EU want to obtain in return? Market access seems to
be the evident answer. This is what trade negotiations are about.
The European Commission's Directorate-General for external
trade would come under pressure if EU concessions were not
used to enhance market access for European exporters in grow-
ing and important emerging markets. When it comes to bilater-
alism with Russia and China, an FTA with the EC does not seem
to be a suitable trade instrument at the moment. Nevertheless,
the EU can expect a mutual benefit as well as greater economic
and political ties.
What remains to be done? It is not about what, but how one
negotiates: The European Commission should negotiate more
constructively, without patronizing, and instead accept the BRIC
countries as equal players in the current multipolar framework
of global economic governance. This is difficult to achieve as
there are differences among the BRIC countries: Brazil and In-
dia are not yet economic superpowers; they are only starting to
grow into a more powerful role. The EU should try to foster this
positive development in a cooperative stance and establish trust.
China and Russia, however, are in some areas more assertive
than Brazil and India. So EU partnership with China and Russia
is more difficult than with Brazil and India. The EU is not in a
stronger position vis-d-vis China and Russia due to the large Chi-
nese market and China's growing economic and political power.
In this sense, the EU expects China to assume a multilateral re-
sponsibility commensurate with the benefits it derives from the
world trading system because with greater power and a greater
voice comes greater responsibility. Compared to India or Brazil,
China's role in the world trading system is rather passive both at
the WTO's dispute settlement system as well as in the Doha
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
In Russia's case, the renaissance of the country's self-confi-
dence seems evident thanks to its vast energy supply. Neverthe-
less, I maintain my point that Russia should have as a priority the
conclusion of negotiations to enter the WTO in order to fully
integrate into the global trading system and protect its growing
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interests on world markets. WTO membership will certainly
help eliminate any discrimination against Russia in its trade and
investment. Moreover, in regard to energy, Brussels should di-
versify its supply in order to overcome the EU's dependency on
Russia, and greater emphasis should be placed on locally gener-
ated renewable sources of energy.
